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PRO-DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION IN AFRICA

JEREMY I. LEVITT*

I. INTRODUCTION

In the past twenty years the people of the African continent
have experienced human suffering on a scale unparalleled in human
history. Millions of Africans, especially women and children, have
been killed by deadly conflict in Angola (650,000), the Democratic
Republic of Congo (3 million), Sudan (2.5 million), Rwanda (1
million), Burundi (300,000), Liberia (250,000), Sierra Leone
(75,000), and Uganda (40,000).' Besides these huge fatalities, warfare
has also affected democratization and human, social, and economic
development; has led to the breakdown of the rule of law; and has
allowed the catastrophic impact of the HIV/AIDS pandemic to reap
havoc on Africa's human architecture.2
The international system of peace and security, including
the scheme provided under the United Nations Charter framework,
*Dr. Jeremy Levitt is an associate professor of law at Florida International University College of
Law and a distinguished research scholar at the Northern Illinois University College of Law.
This article is dedicated to the loving memory of my dear friend, mentor and brother, Advocate
James Thomas, former Associate Dean of Admissions and Financial Aid at the University of
Wisconsin-Madison Law School. Sections of this article were taken with permission of the
American Society of InternationalLaw, Global Dialogue, Ashgate Publishing, and the Temple
Journal of Internationaland Comparative Law from the following works of the author: Jeremy
Levitt, The Evolving Intervention Regime in Africa: From Basket Case to Market Place?, 2002
AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. NINETY-SIXTH ANN. MEETING 136; Jeremy Levitt, The Law on
Intervention: Africa's Pathbreaking Model, GLOBAL DIALOGUE, Winter/Spring 2005, at 50;
Jeremy Levitt, African Interventionist States and International Law, in AFRICAN
INTERVENTIONIST STATES 15 (Oliver Furley & Roy May eds., 2001); Jeremy Levitt,
Humanitarian Intervention by Regional Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in
Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 333 (1998); Jeremy I. Levitt, Illegal
Peace?: Examining the Legality of Power-Sharingwith Warlords and Rebels in Africa, 27 MICH.
J. INT'L L. 495 (2006). The author would like to thank all of the participants at the symposium
"Humanitarian Intervention After 9/11," held at the University of Wisconsin-Madison Law
School on March 31, 2006, for their constructive comments on his presentation on prodemocratic intervention in Africa. He also thanks his graduate assistant, Jordan Dollar, for
assisting in researching and drafting the background sections on Sho Tom and Prfncipe and
Togo.
See generally Jeremy Levitt, The Law on Intervention: Africa's Pathbreaking Model, GLOBAL
DIALOGUE, Winter/Spring 2005, at 50 [hereinafter Levitt, The Law on Intervention].
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has not offered a viable strategy to reduce armed conflict and
human suffering and solidify democracy in Africa. For its part, the UN
Security Council (UNSC) has been uninterested in or too slow to react
to illegal seizures of power and armed conflict in the continent.' It has
also failed to forward an effective approach to assist states emerging
from conflict to build, or rebuild, and sustain democracy-with the result
too often being democratic elections without authentic democratic
transitions. Consequently, African states and their organizations have
sought to fashion African solutions to African problems by creating
innovative rules and mechanisms for pro-democracy and human rightsbased intervention. These rules and structures are, in turn, evolving
the law of intervention and, in my view, have been the most credible
examples and the single most important force in the development of
pro-democratic intervention (PDI) and humanitarian intervention norms.
For the past decade I have examined and documented the
evolution of Africa's peacekeeping, peace enforcement, regional
collective security, and conflict management landscape as well as
Africa's contribution to international law, particularly as it relates to the
jus ad bellum, "the law of the use of force". Although an abundance of
scholarly work and official studies have examined the complexities of
humanitarian intervention, 4 only a select body of credible work has
considered the phenomenon of PDI-very little of which has made
mention of Africa. Given that Africa has developed the most radical
and unique approach to PDI in the world, the lack of study is
unfortunate.
This Article offers a conceptual framework to locate PDI in
international law. It is limited to the identification of PDI as an
emerging norm of international law deeply rooted in the African
experience. As Fernando Tes6n notes, PDI is anchored in the belief that
"the principle of democratic rule is today part of international law"5 and
that state practice has "evaluated the principle of democracy to the
category of a rule which is fully enforceable through appropriate regional

id.
See, e.g., Int'l Comm'n on Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICISS], The Responsibility to
Protect (Dec. 2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/Commission-Report.pdf; see also
ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Research, Bibliography, Background (Dec. 2001)
(prepared by Thomas G. Weiss & Don Hubert), available at http://www.iciss.ca/pdf/
Supplementary-Volume.pdf [hereinafter ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Bibliography].
5 Fernando Tes6n, Collective HumanitarianIntervention, 17 MICH. J. INT'L L. 323, 335 (1996).
3
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collective mechanisms."6 While Tes6n's analysis focuses primarily on
the development of democracy as a rule through the experiences of
nations and institutions in Europe and the Americas, his central thesis is
enormously strengthened and far more compelling when considered
against the revolutionary evolution of Africa's PDI and humanitarian
intervention regimes, which surpass in every conceivable way those of
any other region.7
Africa's intervention regime is derived from African state
practice and treaty law fashioned in the continent. Consequently,
this Article will examine several case studies where the
preservation of democracy was a central rationale for intervention,
employing a structural approach to highlight the normative
development of the frameworks governing intervention in Africa. The
Article is meant to be a snapshot rather than a comprehensive
treatment of the law and practice of PDI in Africa. The central cases
under review include the interventions by the Economic Community
of West African States (ECOWAS) in Liberia, Sierra Leone,
Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, C6te d' Ivoire, and Togo; the Mission for the
Implementation of the Bangui Agreement (MISAB) in the Central
African Republic
(CAR);
Southern African Development
Community (SADC) operation in Lesotho; and African Union (AU)
action in Sdo Tom6 and Prfncipe.' I also discuss the binding treaty law
and security mechanisms of the AU, ECOWAS, and SADC that gave
impetus to these interventions,9 and lay to rest questions about the

6

Id.; FERNANDO TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY

185 (3d ed. 2006).
Levitt, The Law on Intervention, supra note I, at 51.
8 For an analysis of the legality of several of the aforementioned interventions, see Jeremy Levitt,
African Interventionist States and InternationalLaw, in AFRICAN INTERVENTIONIST STATES 15
(Oliver Furley & Roy May eds., 2001) [hereinafter Levitt, African InterventionistStates].
According to Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the international
principle pacta sun servanda states that "every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and
must be performed by them in good faith." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. Accordingly, all member states of the AU and ECOWAS are
legally bound to abide by and perform their organizational rules/frameworks and duties,
respectively. Since, as the following analysis will reveal, PDI and humanitarian intervention are
essential conditions of both the constitutive acts and subsequent protocols that codified them,
good faith compliance with them is essential. The only lawful way for a member state of the AU
and/or ECOWAS to avoid being subject to PDI is to formally withdraw as a member of the
organizations. There are provisions for withdrawal under articles 32 and 64 of the AU and
ECOWAS constitutive acts, respectively. Charter of the Organization of African Unity art.
XXXII, May 25, 1963, 479 U.N.T.S. 39; Treaty of the Economic Community of West African
States, W. Afr. Countries, art. 64, May 28, 1975, 1010 U.N.T.S. 17. For an interesting and
7
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existence of a right to PDI insofar as it relates to the African region.'" In
a sense the Article confirms Tom Farer's prediction that a group of
democratic states might one day form a pact that:
in the event of an unconstitutional seizure of power in one pact
member, others will continue to recognize the displaced elected
officials as the only legitimate authority and, at their request, will
take appropriate measures to reestablish constitutional government.
If the officials are unable to communicate an appeal for assistance,
the other pact members will consult and may by a vote of two-thirds
or more of the member states choose to intervene militarily to restore
democracy. "

As the forgoing analysis will reveal, the question is no longer
whether states will form a pact to protect against unconstitutional
seizures of government. Rather, the questions have become: At what
stage of development is the "doctrine" of PDI? And when and under
what circumstances might the threat or use of force be employed to
safeguard democracy?
PDI is an evolving term and phenomenon, namely because
the jus ad bellum, human rights law, and the emerging regime on
democracy are in flux and because PDI seems to import several
independent international law norms, including, among others, the
and humanitarian
doctrines of consent, self-determination,
intervention. All of these doctrines intersect with the evolving norm
of democracy or what Thomas Franck has termed the "democratic
entitlement."'' 2 PDI appears to be evolving in five contemporaneous and
perhaps interdependent ways, and the direction of its evolution will depend
on the political factors that underlie future threats to democratically
constituted governments, and the responses to them by states and their
organizations. In Africa, a norm of PDI has crystallized through: (1) the
consent doctrine (whether treaty-based or ad hoc); (2) customary regional

controversial analysis of the legality of treaty-based intervention, see David Wippman, TreatyBased Intervention: Who Can Say No?, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 607 (1995).
10 See generally Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-DemocraticInvasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645
(1984).
1 Tom Faer, A Paradigm of Legitimate Intervention, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE
INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL CONFLICTS 316, 332 (Lori Fisler Damrosch ed., 1993).
12 See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46
(1992) (arguing that representative democracy is evolving into an international legal obligation).
See also Gregory H. Fox, The Right to PoliticalParticipationin InternationalLaw, 17 YALE J.
INT'L L. 539, 607 (1992) (arguing that "parties to the major human rights conventions have
created an international law of participatory rights"). See generally DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW

(Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
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law; 3 (3) the doctrine of self-determination (a jus cogens norm); (4) the
emerging doctrine on democracy (emerging customary international law);
and (5) perhaps, customary international law similar to the doctrine of
humanitarian intervention. Although it is beyond the scope of this study to
examine the development of all of these doctrines-all of which are
controversial to varying degrees-their thorough examination in the context
of PDI is sorely needed.
In the legal context, PDI may be defined in several ways,
depending on the legal basis or authority used to justify it. Because the
law is in flux, it is difficult to determine definitively which rules
ultimately will comprise the legal authority of any norm of PDI; for this
reason, this Article analyzes concrete state and regional organizational
practices and treaty law in the only region that has adopted it as an
unqualified right: Africa. 4 State practice and treaty law in Africa
indicate that, today, PDI is an intervention by a state, group of states,
or regional organization in another state involving the threat or use
of force in order to protect or restore a democratically constituted
government (DCG) from unlawful and/or violent seizures of power, 5
especially when the circumstances that underpin such seizures
threaten a substantial part of a state's population with death or
suffering on a grand scale.
PDI is preoccupied with serving the twin aims of protecting
existing and future governments and peoples and preserving DCGs
from illegal seizures of power from within rather than the "right of a
state to use armed force to overthrow a despotic government in
another country."' 6 PDI seeks to safeguard DCGs irrespective of their
character, except for those that rise to power unconstitutionally,
interfere with a people's right to self-determination, or acts unduly

13

14

While today PDI in Africa is based on consent and customary regional law, a norm of PDI in
customary international law is fast developing and will likely not require prior consent of an
embattled DCG-let alone a junta that has unlawfully seized power-as the notion of PDI is
based on the illumination of democracy as an enforceable right.
The Latin America region has also made significant strides in developing a right of PDI through
the Organization of American States (OAS).The U.S.-led OAS mission in Haiti in 1994 was the
first regional organization to authorize the use of force to protect democracy. See generally
Domingo E. Acevedo, The Haitian Crisis and the OAS Response: A Test of Effectiveness in
Protecting Democracy, in ENFORCING RESTRAINT: COLLECTIVE INTERVENTION IN INTERNAL
CONFLICTS,

supra note 11,at 119.

15 For purposes of this analysis, the term "democratically constituted governments" is broadly

16

construed to mean those that are democratically elected or otherwise rise to power lawfully
and/or those that are widely recognized as legitimate.
Schachter, supra note 10, at 645.
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repressive. 7 Hence, in Africa, PDI appears to place a positive duty on
states to remove threats to DCGs (e.g., unlawful rebellion and
insurgency) and a negative duty on them not to support evil regimes
or save repressive regimes from democratic revolution. Thus, PDI is
meant to safeguard DCGs and legitimate regimes and accomplish the
broader aims of maintaining peace, security, and law and order in
states. In nascent and even intolerant democracies, 8 PDI in Africa
endeavors to maintain law and order to ensure an enabling
environment for transition to authentic democracy. Again, it does not
seek to establish democracy where it does not exist but to preserve
democracy where it does.
The logic underpinning PDI in Africa focuses on how a
regime came to power rather than its behavior while in power. Stated
differently, under international law, an unpopular regime or state is no
less entitled to exist free from external intrusion in its internal affairs
than a popular one; however, as already noted, international law does
not necessarily prohibit internal forces within a state from removing
an unduly repressive regime. Nevertheless, DCGs that do not
necessarily have a democratic orientation have benefited and will
likely continue to benefit from PDI.
The democracy-based
interventions of the AU, ECOWAS, and SADC in budding
democracies in Sierra Leone (1997), Guinea-Bissau (1998), C6te
d'Ivoire (1998), Lesotho (1998), Sdo Tom6 and Prfncipe (2003), and
Togo (2005) are cases in point.
While there is no evidence in either African treaty law or state
practice to conclude that a right of PDI exists against autocratic, corrupt,
or politically as opposed to violently oppressive regimes-in contrast to

See G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 123-24, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (Oct. 24, 1970) (Declaration on
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States
in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations); G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), art. 7, U.N.
Doc. A/9619 (Dec. 14, 1974) (Definition of Aggression); G.A. Res. 42/22, 22, U.N. Doc.
A/42/766 (Nov. 18, 1987) (Declaration on the Enhancement of the Effectiveness of the Principle
of Refraining from the Threat or Use of Force in International Relations). In this context, the
term "unduly repressive" connotes the systematic and violent repression of citizens of a state in
order to prevent them from freely participating in government. This may include, among other
things, the torture and killing of political opposition and other government detractors, stifling of
political participation, unwillingness to conduct free and fair elections, rigging elections and
silencing the media.
8 See generally Gregory H. Fox and George Nolte, IntolerantDemocracies,36 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1,
1 (1995) (exploring "the legal issues raised by the presence of anti-democratic actors in an
otherwise generally 'free and fair' electoral process").

'7
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the purported American neorealist approach' 9 --external intervention to
simply unseat a bad DCG would be unlawful. Under Africa's current
legal framework, a DCG or legitimate government would have to be
unduly oppressive to its citizens for outside actors to invoke a right of
PDI against it. However, if the international community were unwilling
or unable to stop a government from being unduly repressive, external
intervention aimed at preventing a population from forcefully removing a
democratically constituted but repressive government would debatably
interfere with their "democratic entitlement""0 : their right to safeguard
their own human rights and their right to self-determination. 2' In terms
of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, such action would arguably be an
intervention against the sovereignty and political independence of a state
engaged in a war of liberation-that is, a war aimed at establishing
democracy and thwarting human atrocities.22 As Oscar Schachter noted,
"No state today would deny the basic principle that the people of a nation
have the right, under international law, to decide for themselves what
kind of government they want, and that this includes the right to revolt
and to carry on armed conflict between competing groups. ' 23 It follows
that DCGs may come to power through democratic processes or by
democratic revolution when the behavior of a state is so egregious and
repressive that its removal from power by indigenous or other forces is
justified under international law.
Yet, it is often not clear when states and regional organizations
in Africa have relied on democracy, human rights, or broader
humanitarian considerations as opposed to national strategic interests as
the basis for intervention; many of the civil conflicts that have
necessitated intervention have had mixed motives and multiple
objectives. Hence, for purposes of this analysis, it is important to briefly
19 The "neorealists see the use of force as an effective instrument to further other principles that

they believe are integral to the UN Charter: self-determination, human rights, and above all
democracy." However, the American neorealists school as, perhaps, best articulated by the
Reagan Doctrine "reject any norm of international law that would forbid military assistance
(including direct American intervention) to a prodemocratic insurgency fighting to overthrow a
totalitarian government dependent upon external support." David J. Scheffer, Introduction: The
Great Debate of the 1980s, in Louis HENKIN ET AL., RIGHT V. MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND THE USE OF FORCE 1,11 (2d ed. 1991).

20 See generally Franck, supra note 12.
21 See David

Wippman,

Practical and Legal

Constraints on

Internal Powersharing,

in

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ETHNIC CONFLICT 211, 227-28 (David Wippman ed., 1998).
22 Oscar Schachter, International Law: The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV.

1620, 1641 (1984).
23 Id.
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distinguish some of the major differences between PDI and humanitarian
intervention because both doctrines are, at least in part, applicable to the
case studies under review. Several of the interventions in this study
could arguably have been justified under both paradigms. The next
section contrasts PDI and humanitarian intervention.

II. PRO-DEMOCRATIC INTERVENTION AND HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION

There are several notable similarities and differences between
pro-democratic intervention and humanitarian intervention.24 In the
African context, both derive their lawfulness from general international
law, treaty law, and customary regional law and have the ultimate aims
of protecting fundamental human rights and maintaining peace, security,
stability, and law and order within states. Today, PDI is typically, but
not exclusively, based on state consent (whether treaty-based or ad hoc)
or authorized by the UN Security Council. Conversely, humanitarian
intervention is not based on valid state consent, takes place without
UNSC authorization, and is concerned primarily with curbing mass
human suffering. Both PDI and humanitarian intervention can be
conducted by states acting on their own initiative (e.g., Nigeria in
Liberia), collectively through ad hoc groupings (e.g., MISAB in the
CAR), and through regional organizations (e.g., ECOWAS in Sierra
Leone). 5 PDI in Africa does not raise the same "legal barriers" as
humanitarian intervention because it does not abrogate the well-settled
international law doctrines on state sovereignty, territorial integrity, and
24

25

Again, state practice and treaty law in Africa indicate that, today, PDI is an intervention by a
state, group of states, regional organization, or the UN involving the threat or use of
force in order to protect or restore a government from unlawful and/or violent seizures of
power, especially when the circumstances underpinning such seizures threaten a
substantial part of the state's population with death or suffering on a grand scale. I have
defined humanitarian intervention as an "[i]ntervention in a state involving the use of force (U.N.
action in Iraq and Somalia or ECOWAS action in Liberia and Sierra Leone [and Guinea-Bissau])
or threat of force (U.N. action in Haiti), where the intervener deploys armed forces and, at the
least, makes clear that it is willing to use force if its operation is resisted-as it attempts to
alleviate conditions in which a substantial part of the population of a state is threatened with
death or suffering on a grand scale." Jeremy Levitt, Humanitarian Intervention by Regional
Actors in Internal Conflicts: The Cases of ECOWAS in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 12 TEMP.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 333, 335 (1998) [hereinafter Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by Regional
Actors].
However, there is a general consensus among states, scholars and practitioners that collective
interventions are the most legally credible.
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nonintervention in the internal affairs of states. Again, today, PDI
generally derives its legality from the doctrines of consent (ad hoc or
treaty-based) but not yet from customary international law, wherein
proponents of humanitarian intervention argue its legal basis.
Today, PDI and humanitarian intervention are also not deterred
by a government's lack of effective control, i.e., its ability to validly
consent to intervention. Whether a government is in effective control
does not seem to seriously affect the legality and legitimacy of either
type of intervention, though for different reasons.
Humanitarian
intervention is aimed at using force against a state to remedy grave
human suffering. The goal of curbing ongoing human torment alone
provides the legal basis for the intervention; state consent is moot. While
PDI can be based on state consent, it seeks to safeguard DCGs
irrespective of who is in de facto control because the intervention is on
behalf of the government that acquired power democratically or is
otherwise considered legitimate. Hence, even ousted regimes lacking
effective control can make a valid request for intervention.26
Consequently, today, under Africa's new democracy and governance
framework, de facto control no longer guarantees rebels or brokers of
unconstitutional changes in power formal recognition or a seat at the
table of power; when there have been unconstitutional regime changes,
democratic governance appears to have attained a more prominent status
than the effective control doctrine.27 As one analyst has noted, "[T]he
statist version of legitimacy grounded on the logic of 'defactoism' or
effectiveness ought to be abandoned as it has masked the worst
violations of civil and political rights."28 Simply put, the democratic
entitlement that underlies PDI is chiseling away at traditional
conceptions of the effective control doctrine.29
African states and regional organizations, historically among the
most conservative subscribers to the international law principles of state
sovereignty, nonintervention, and territorial integrity today, have

26

For example, Jean Bertrand Aristide's plea for U.S. intervention in Haiti in 1994 and Tejan

27

Kabbah's request for ECOWAS action in Sierra Leone are cases in point.
See infra notes 287-298 and accompanying text for a discussion of Africa's new democracy and

28

governance framework.
Reginald Ezetah, The Right to Democracy: A Qualitative hiquiry, 22 BROOK. J.INT'L L. 495,

29

526-27 (1997).
The three most authoritative legal sources that provide for a norm of PDI in Africa, and perhaps
beyond, are found in African state practice, treaty law, and regional organizational practice;
however, regional customary law, UN law, the doctrine of self-determination and the emerging
doctrine on democracy also provide legal bases for PDL.
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adopted, operationalized, and acted under norm-creating mechanisms
that are eroding traditional prohibitions on the use of force enshrined
in the UN Charter and general international law.3" In fact, Africa is the
first region to advance a comprehensive collective security regime. 3
From a normative standpoint, the continent's intervention regime is
more advanced and legally coherent than any other, including that of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)-a fact that deserves greater
attention in scholarly literature and among policy makers.

III. WESTERN MYOPIA
In international law and studies, Africa is viewed as a pariah-a
basket case, not a marketplace. Most policymakers, international
lawyers, and legal academics outside of the continent consider African
states to be objects rather than subjects of international law. This fact
explains why a significant portion of the wide body of literature on the
law of the use of force and, more specifically, peacekeeping and
The geopolitical,
intervention is heavily biased and flawed.32
Eurocentric, and linear bias in Western legal academia, among
others, is truly unfortunate. This predisposition is to a large degree
based on a lack of interest, training, and regional expertise, particularly
on the developing world, among Western intellectuals and international
lawyers.
30 Levitt, The Law on Intervention, supra note 1, at 51.
31 id.

32 For example, at first glance, one of the most recent articles on democracy, sovereignty, and

intervention appears to be solid and convincing; however, upon further review the article suffers
from spotty research and apparent geo-political bias because it fails to examine the phenomena
of intervention in Africa. Consequently it makes shamefully inaccurate conclusions. The article
makes no mention of African state practice or treaty law developments nor references Africa's
emerging democracy and intervention regime. See Andrew Coleman & Jackson Maogoto,
Democracy's Global Quest: A Noble Crusade Wrapped in Dirty Reality?, 28 SUFFOLK
TRANSNAT'L L.REV. 175 (2005). These omissions are unacceptable given that, as the foregoing
analysis will demonstrate, Africa has forwarded the world's most radical legal doctrine and
security mechanisms to protect human rights and democracy. The authors of the article claim
that "minimal international and regional procedures exist for responding to unconstitutional
seizures of power." Id. at 197. They assert that regional organizations "lack consensus on
strengthening institutional capacity to promote democracy" and that "[a]ny departure from
present practice [of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states] must survive the scrutiny
of. . . potentially hostile regional blocs in... Africa." Id. at 198. Such analysis illuminates the
linear bias and open ignorance about Africa's interventionist regime and contributions to
international law, particularly the jus ad bellum. Unfortunately, such unintended bias and
piecemeal analysis in international law is not the exception but the rule.
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As a result, topical discussions on PDI and humanitarian
intervention in Africa are either uninformed or inadequately analyzed.
More often than not, when analysts assess Africa's security landscape,
they do so with a Eurocentric or, even worse, colonial voicepaternalistic and unaware. This phenomenon is unfortunate because it
creates an environment for geo-political bias and analytically weak
scholarship that often fails to acknowledge Africa's contribution to
international law, particularly as it relates to jus ad bellum.33
The sections that follow assess the evolution of the PDI regime
in Africa by analyzing African state practice, treaty law, regional
organizational practice, and UN responses, or lack thereof, to them.
Primary attention will be given to the ECOWAS, SADC, AU, and the
states that compose them. As the analysis shows, PDI has been
conducted by states acting in an ad hoc fashion or through regional
actors.

IV. ECOWAS
In 1975 ECOWAS was founded by treaty.34 Its main aim at the

time was to spur economic integration and development in West
Africa.35 Regional security was an important but not vital concern.36
ECOWAS later adopted a Protocol on Non-Aggression in 1978 and a Protocol Relating to Mutual Assistance on Defense in 1981." 7 Neither the
treaty nor the protocols empowered ECOWAS to launch peacekeeping
missions (although the 1981 protocol did empower it to intervene in
conflicts that were "externally engineered"). In 1989 the eruption of the
Liberian Civil War tested ECOWAS;38 owing to international inaction, the

organization was forced to intervene unilaterally (i.e., without Security
Council authorization) to halt the conflict.39

33 See generally AFRICA: MAPPING NEW BOUNDARIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Jeremy

I. Levitt

ed., forthcoming 2006).
Levitt, The Law on Intervention, supra note 1, at 51.

'4
35 Id.
36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by Regional Actors, supra note 24, at 342-43. The civil war
lasted from 1989 to 1997. JEREMY 1. LEVITT, THE EVOLUTION OF DEADLY CONFLICT IN
LIBERIA: FROM 'PATERNALISM' To STATE COLLAPSE 206-10 (2005) [hereinafter LEVITT,

CONFLICT IN LIBERIA].
39 Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by Regional Actors, supra note 24, at 346.
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A. LIBERIA
The Liberian Civil War began in 1989 when Charles Taylor and
a group of so-called dissidents launched an attack against security
personnel in Nimba County (located on the Liberia/C6te d'Ivoire border)
and advanced toward.thecapital city of Monrovia.40 The group led by
Taylor called themselves the National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL).4
The NPFL recruited soldiers from many ethnic groups,
foremost among them the Mano and Gio, and proceeded to crush the
U.S.-backed Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) of President Sergeant
Samuel K. Doe." By May 1990 the NPFL controlled significantly more
territory than Doe's collapsing regime, which had lost effective control
of the state.43
Liberian security forces suffered enormous losses on the
battlefield, which led Doe, who was facing certain defeat, to make
several unsuccessful appeals to the people of Liberia, the United Nations,
and the U.S. government for military assistance.' Finally he appealed to
ECOWAS to introduce a peace-keeping force into Liberia to "forestall
increasing terror and tension" (i.e., to restore his decrepit government to
power).45
On August 7, 1990, the ECOWAS Standing Mediation
Commission ("Commission") agreed to establish an ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) in Liberia to halt the "wanton
destruction of human life and property and.., massive damage.., being
caused by the armed conflict to the stability and survival of the entire
Liberian nation."46 ECOMOG was mandated to "restor[e] law and order
to create the necessary conditions for free and fair elections. 47 On
40

Id. at 342; see also LEVITT, CONFLICT INLIBERIA, supra note 38, at 206.

4

LEVITT, CONFLICT IN LIBERIA, supra note 38, at 206.

42

Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by RegionalActors, supra note 24, at 342.

43

Id.

44 Id. at 243.
45 Letter addressed by President Samuel K. Doe to the Chairman and Members of the Ministerial
Meeting of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (July 14, 1990), in REGIONAL PEACE-

60-61 (M. Weller ed.,
1994) [hereinafter THE LIBERIAN CRISIS].
46 See Economic Cmty. of West African States [ECOWAS], Standing Mediation Comm., Decision
on the Cease-Fireand Establishment of ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Groups for Liberia,
Decision A.DEC. 1/8/90 (Aug. 7, 1990), reprinted in THE LIBERIAN CRISIS, supra note 45, at 67.
47 Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
KEEPING AND INTERNATIONAL ENFORCEMENT: THE LIBERIAN CRISIS
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August 24, ECOMOG entered Liberia to forestall the killing, restore law
and order, and prevent the state from descending into further anarchy."8
The NPFL, which by then controlled approximately 90 percent of the
country, abducted and attacked ECOMOG forces upon their entry into
the country.49
The situation worsened when, in September, Doe was murdered
by the Independent National Patriotic Front, an NPFL splinter group."0
ECOWAS eventually stabilized the situation and nearly two years later,
on November 19, 1992, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution
788, calling for the restoration of peace and a complete weapons
embargo against Liberia and authorizing ECOWAS to enforce its terms.',
Ten months later, on September 22, 1993, the Security Council adopted
Resolution 866,52 which called for the creation of the UN Observer
Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL), stating "that this would be the first
peace-keeping mission undertaken by the United Nations in co-operation
with a peace-keeping mission already set up by another organization, in
this case the ECOWAS. 53
I have argued elsewhere that the Security Council's stance affirmed
the legality of the ECOWAS action and placed a retroactive de jure seal on
its Liberia operation, confirming that the breakdown of law and order,
protection of human rights, and the restoration of the rule of law were valid
justifications for intervention by ECOWAS and later the UN." ECOWAS's
action was also arguably the first genuine case of humanitarian
intervention.55 At the very least, the approach by ECOWAS and the
Security Council in this case confirmed that an intervention taken outside

48 LEVITr, CONFLICT IN LIBERIA, supra note 38, at 208.
49 Id. at 206.

0 Id. at 207.
5' Id. at 209; see also S.C. Res. 788, I1 8, 10, U.N. Doc. S/RESI788 (Nov. 19, 1992).
S.C. Res. 866, U.N. Doc. S/RES/866 (Sept. 23, 1993).

12

53

Id.

Moreover, "[bletween 22 January 1991 and 27 November 1996, the [Security] Council adopted fifteen
resolutions directly relating to the situation in Liberia, in addition, the President of the Security Council
issued nine statements in this connection." U.N. Dep't of Pub. Info., The United Nations and the
Situation in Liberia, at 35, U.N. Doc. [ST/] DPI/1697/Rev.1 (1997). Almost every resolution and
statement commended ECOWAS for its efforts, asked UN member states to support it financially,
requested African states to contribute troops to its mission, and condemned attacks against it by
rebel factions; not once was ECOWAS condemned for unlawful action or inappropriate conduct.
Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by Regional Actors, supra note 24, at 347.
55 See Levitt, HumanitarianInterventionby Regional Actors, supra note 24, at 350-51.
54
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the authority of the UN Charter to maintain law and order and protect
human rights could indeed be lawful. 6
Although it has yet to be widely recognized as such, the ECOWAS
intervention was a watershed in the jus ad bellum and should not only be
considered as the first authentic post-Cold War case of humanitarian
intervention but also one aimed at creating an enabling environment for
democracy. The fact that the Credentials Committee of the UN refused
to accredit, recognize, or grant UN General Assembly representation to
the so-called government of Charles Taylor in Liberia (until he won
elections in 1997),"7 despite the fact that he was in effective control of the
state, speaks volumes about the rising status of the democracy regime
and legitimacy of ECOWAS law in relation to the fledging status of the
effective control doctrine. It also signals the validity of an intervention
with pro-democratic components; the committee's decision not to
accredit belligerents seems to have rested primarily "upon whether the
applicant government was democratic and whether the applicant
government originally came to power by overthrowing a democratic
government."5

B. ECOWAS REVISED TREATY OF 1993
In July 1993, three years into its peace creation mission in
Liberia,59 ECOWAS adopted the Revised Treaty of 1993 to, in part, provide a
treaty basis for future peacekeeping.' The contracting parties to the treaty
56

Some commentators have perhaps legitimately criticized the conduct of certain ECOMOG

officials in Liberia, but none, in the author's view, have credibly challenged the legality of the
intervention itself. The highly controversial operation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) in Kosovo came four years after the ECOMOG operation, making the latter the
legitimate watershed case of humanitarian intervention and debatably PDI.
57 Jeremy I. Levitt, Illegal Peace?: Examining the Legality of Power-Sharing with Warlords and
Rebels in Africa, 27 MICH. J.INT'L L. 495, 570 (2006).
58 Matthew Griffin, Accrediting Democracies: Does the Credentials Committee of the United
Nations Promote Democracy Through Its Accreditation Process, and Should It?, 32 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & POL. 725, 725-26 (2000).
In fact, the Credentials Committee accredited
representatives of Samuel Doe's government even though it lost power and Doe was killed in
1990. Id. at 746. According to Griffin, the central consequence of not being accredited is the
inability to participate in the business of the General Assembly. Id. at 732.
59 Funmi Olonisakin, Conflict Management in Africa: The Role of the OAU and Sub-Regional
Organizations,in INST. FOR SECURITY STUDIES, ISS MONOGRAPH 46, BUILDING STABILITY IN
AFRICA: CHALLENGE FOR THE NEW MILLENNIUM (Feb. 2000), available at http://www.iss.co.za/
Pubs/Monographs/No46/Conflict.htmrd (last visited Nov. 25, 2006).
60 Revised Treaty of the Economic Community of West African States, art. 58(f), July 24, 1993, 35
I.L.M. 660 [hereinafter Revised Treaty], reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS ON
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affirmed and declared their adherence to the "maintenance of regional
peace, stability, and security,"' 6 "recognition, promotion, and protection of
human and people's rights, 62 and the "promotion and consolidation of a
democratic system of governance in each member State."63 As part of its
regional security aims, ECOWAS obligates itself, at the request of member
states, to provide assistance for the observance of democratic elections'
and to "establish a regional peace and security observation system and
peace-keeping forces where appropriate."65 The treaty also provides for
the adoption of protocols detailing additional provisions governing
political cooperation and regional peace and stability.66

1. Sierra Leone
On May 25, 1997, approximately six months after the end of the
civil war in Sierra Leone and shortly after the country's democratic
elections, several junior military elements led by Major Johnny Koromah
and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) carried out a successful coup
d'6tat against President Ahmed Tejan Kabbah's democratically elected
government, forcing him to flee to Guinea.67 Before leaving Sierra
Leone, however, Kabbah requested that Nigeria and ECOWAS intervene
to forestall the conflict and restore constitutional order to the country.68
Additionally, the international community, including the UN and OAU,
sternly condemned the coup.69 The OAU formally requested ECOWAS to
intervene to restore Kabbah's regime to power, and UN Secretary-General
Kofi Annan made similar pleas.
In response to Kabbah's request, on May 26, 1997, Nigeria (not
ECOMOG) sent forces to Sierra Leone to forestall the conflict and
restore constitutional order (i.e., return Kabbah to power).7" When they
initially landed, Nigerian forces were met with strong resistance from the
63,95 (Jeremy
I. Levitt ed., 2003) [hereinafter AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS].
Id. art. 4(e), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supranote 60, at 63, 68.
I'
4
62 Id. art. (g), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 63, 68.
63 Id. art. 4(j), reprintedin AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 63, 68.
CONSTITUTIVE, CONFLICT AND SECURITY, HUMANITARIAN AND JUDICIAL ISSUES

Id. art. 58(2)(g), reprintedin AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 63, 95.
"' Id. art. 58(2)(f), reprintedin AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 63, 95.
66 Id. art. 58(3), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 63, 95.
64

'"

Levitt, African InterventionistStates, supra note 8, at 22.

68 ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect:Bibliography, supra note 4, at 105.
69 Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by Regional Actors, supra note 24, at 365.

70 Levitt, African Interventionist States, supra note 8, at 23.
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junta and were forced to retreat, but later they were able to push back the
rebels and secure sections of the country.7' Likewise, in early August,
pursuant to requests by member states of ECOWAS, General Sani
Abacha, former Nigerian head of state and ECOWAS chairman, appears
to have issued an executive directive authorizing an economic blockade
against Sierra Leone to be enforced by ECOMOG.72 On August 30,
during the Twentieth Summit of ECOWAS in Abuja, ECOWAS
officially mandated ECOMOG to enforce sanctions against the junta and
restore law and order to the country.73 On October 8, the UNSC
supported these various efforts by adopting Resolution 1132, which
deplored the coup and the junta's unwillingness to restore the
"democratically elected Government" and constitutional order.74 Acting
under its Chapter VII enforcement powers, the UNSC also demanded
that the junta "relinquish power" and "make way for the restoration of
the democratically elected Government and a return to constitutional
order,"75 and strongly supported ECOWAS efforts to restore Kabbah's
government to power.76 Acting under its Chapter VIII authority, the
UNSC sanctioned ECOWAS to enforce an arms and petroleum embargo
and travel restrictions against the junta and halt, inspect, and verify the
cargo and destinations of all inward-shipping vessels.77
On February 5, 1998, "responding to an attack by junta forces on
their position at Lungi, ECOMOG launched a military attack on the
junta," which led to its removal from power and expulsion from Free
Town on February 12.78 By early March, "ECOMOG [had] established
itself successfully across most of the country."79 On March 10, Kabbah
returned to the capital city, Free Town, to resume his position as
president of Sierra Leone.8" The leaders of Nigeria, Guinea, Mali, and
Niger and the vice-president of the Gambia accompanied him.8'

71 Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by Regional Actors, supra note 24, at 366.
72

Levitt, African InterventionistStates, supra note 8, at 23.

73

id.
74 S.C. Res. 1132, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1 132 (Oct. 8, 1997).
75 id. l.

Id. 3. The U.N. Security Council called on the international community to support and
cooperate with the ECOWAS operation. Id. 1 18.
77 Id. T 8.
78 The Secretary-General, FourthReport of the Secretary-Generalon the Situation in Sierra Leone,
6, U.N. Doc. S/1998/249 (Mar. 18, 1998).
'9 Id. 119.
80 Levitt, African InterventionistStates, supra note 8, at 23.
76

81

Id.
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From a legal standpoint, it is important to note that there were
two separate interventions in Sierra Leone: the first was taken under the
authority of the Republic of Nigeria; the second was undertaken by
ECOWAS. While each intervention arguably had multiple legal bases,
the primary rationale for both was to restore the democratically elected
government of Tejan Kabbah.
The Nigerian intervention in Sierra Leone was justifiable on
several legal bases; 2 however, it was the first PDI by a single state--one
that was applauded by the whole of the international community. The
ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone was also lawful for several
reasons; 3 however, it should be regarded as the most authoritative case
of PDI by a regional organization, given the swiftness with which it took
place and the global unanimity concerning its legitimacy. 4 Both
interventions were retroactively sanctioned through UNSC Resolution
1132.85
The ECOWAS intervention into Sierra Leone debatably could be
classified as both a humanitarian intervention and PDI. I have stated
elsewhere that although Kabbah requested outside intervention while
fleeing to Guinea, his regime was still in effective control of the state, 6
even if it was not in control of Free Town at that time. Moreover,
Kabbah's government "was still recognized as the de jure government by
More importantly,
the whole of the international community.""
however, the civilian population of Sierra Leone continued to recognize
Kabbah as their leader and actively protested and took up arms against
the junta.88 Since it appears that Kabbah lawfully consented to the
intervention, by definition it cannot serve as an example of humanitarian
intervention. I nonetheless have argued:
Shortly after the coup, the situation in the country became chaotic.
Yet it was not consumed by anarchy nor, arguably, at this juncture,
had the junta and RUF committed human rights abuses that would
have warranted humanitarian intervention. Nevertheless, ECOWAS
could lawfully invoke a right of humanitarian intervention because

82

For an in-depth analysis of the legal bases for the Nigerian intervention, see id. at 22-26.

93 id.
94

Id.

85 S.C. Res. 1132, supra note 74.
86 Levitt, African Interventionist States, supra note 8,at 22-24.
87 id.
88 "This is perhaps the first time in contemporary African history that well over 95 per cent
of the
civilian population of a state actively resisted the toppling of a democratically elected regime and
refused to co-operate with and recognize its illegal incumbent." Id.
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the democratic government of Sierra Leone was illegally and
violently dislodged against the will of its civilian populace,8 9 who
because of their opposition to the junta were threatened with death
and suffering on a grand scale. 9° Moreover, civilian opposition by
way of armed resistance and nationwide employment strikes against
the junta intensified the situation and caused the state infrastructure to
collapse. Had ECOMOG not intervened, fighting between the junta
and the RUF on the one hand and the Kamajors and other civilians
loyal to Kabbah on the other would have escalated, resulting in
untold destruction and loss of life. 9'

While the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone arguably
would not qualify as a humanitarian intervention under a strict
interpretation of the term, I defined it broadly enough to include what I
identified as an emerging practice of PDI. I included the unlawful and
violent seizure of DCGs against the will of a threatened civilian populace
within the paradigm of humanitarian intervention because of the
inseparable and interdependent link among violent coups d'6tat, civil
war, and massive human rights violations, and because when the coup in
Sierra Leone took place, there was not sufficient state practice or treaty
law to claim that an independent right of PDI existed. 92 Nevertheless,
statements made by General-Secretary Annan were instructive here
because they seemed to validate the emergence of a pro-democraticright
of intervention when DCGs are overthrown. In the wake of the coup in
Sierra Leone, Annan commented, "Africa can no longer tolerate, and
accept as faits accomplis, coups against elected government, and the
illegal seizure of power by military cliques, who sometimes act for

89 For more on this issue see Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by Regional Actors, supra note 24,
at 369-7 1. See also Jeffrey C. Tuomala, Just Cause: The Thread that Runs So True, 15 DICK. J.
INT'L L. I (1994)(examining the 1989 U.S. intervention in Panama and discussing just war
theory in this context).
90 "However, without a genuine threat of death or grand suffering to the domestic populace of a
state, it has yet to be resolved whether a right to pro-democratic intervention exists.
Nevertheless, based on the diversity of justifiable circumstances that led to the recent AU action
in Slo Tom and Prfncipe, the U.S.-led UN mission in Haiti, the ECOMOG operations in Sierra
Leone, Guinea-Bissau and Togo, MISAB intervention in the CAR, and SADC operation in
Lesotho, it appears a pro-democratic norm that does not include such suffering and falls outside
of the purview of humanitarian intervention is fast developing." Levitt, African Interventionist
States, supra note 8, at 26.
9' Id. at 25-26.

92 Again, this labeling was based on state practice in the Africa region, the nexus between state collapse and
human rights violations in the continent, and a lack of consensus inside and outside of Africa as to the
existence of a norm of PDL
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sectional interests, sometimes simply for their own," and hence, must
take whatever action is necessary to restore constitutional order.93
Today, there appears to be sufficient state practice and treaty law
development to demonstrate the ripening of an independent norm of PDI,
which "falls outside the scope of humanitarian intervention, and may be
better associated with the doctrine of self-determination" or the emerging
right of democracy.94 In this case, ECOWAS action in Sierra Leone was a
watershed case in the shift toward the hardening of a PDI norm. UN practice
seems to support this assertion, given its avid support of ECOWAS action
through Resolution 1132 and the decisions of the UN Credentials Committee,
which refused to accredit UN General Assembly representation for the
supposed government of Johnny Paul Koromo in Sierra Leone in 1997
(after he overthrew Kabbah's democratically elected regime),95 despite
the fact that Koromo was in de facto control of the state. As was the case
in Liberia, the decision not to credit insurrectionists in Sierra Leone
seems to have rested on whether the applicant government was
democratic and whether it came to power by toppling a democratic
government.96 Hence, the case of Sierra Leone arguably signaled the first
clear case of a shift in de legeferenda toward a right of PDI, and the second
time (the first was Haiti) that the acceptability of a government would be
judged by international actors, perhaps evidencing the "rise of popular
'
sovereignty."97

C.

THE

ECOWAS

CONFLICT FRAMEWORK

In October 1998, some fourteen months after the intervention in
Sierra Leone, ECOWAS adopted a binding mechanism to allow for
interstate collaboration in the collective management of regional
security: the Framework for the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
93 Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Calls for Efforts to Unleash African "Third

Wave" Based on Democracy, Human Rights, and Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc.
SG/SM/6245/Rev.1 AFR/9/Rev.1 (June 2, 1997), available at http://www.un.org/News/
Press/docs/1997/19970602.sgsm6245.rl.html.
94 Levitt, HumanitarianIntervention by Regional Actors, supra note 24, at 337 n. 18.
95 Griffin, supra note 58, at 725. In fact, despite its removal from power, the Credentials
Committee "accredited the delegation of the deposed, democratically elected government of
President Kabbah of Sierra Leone." Id. at 747.
96 Id. at 725-26.
97 See Louis E. Fielding, Taking the Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: The
Emerging Right of HumanitarianAssistance to Restore Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L.

338 (1995).
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Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security ("Framework").98
The Framework sets out an elaborate scheme for ECOWAS-ECOMOG
enforcement operations, including a coherent command and control
structure." It calls for the creation of an ECOWAS Mediation and Security Council to authorize all forms of military intervention.
Regarding internal conflicts that are sustained from within,
Paragraph 46 of the Framework provides for military intervention by
ECOWAS when crises (1) threaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster, t°
(2) pose a serious threat to peace and security in the subregion,'' and (3)
erupt following the overthrow or attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government.12 Except for the new African Union, no other
regional organization has laid down a normative framework for unilateral
military intervention. 3 Furthermore, Paragraph 52 of the Framework
provides that ECOMOG may undertake military operations for
peacekeeping," humanitarian intervention in support of humanitarian
actions,0 5 and the enforcement of sanctions and embargos.' °
ECOWAS is thus the first regional arrangement to codify both
humanitarian and pro-democratic rights of intervention.
One year after the ECOWAS intervention in Sierra Leone, its
capacity to maintain peace and security and law and order in West Africa
was tested again by the conflict in Guinea-Bissau.

98 Framework Establishing the ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management,
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, July 24, 1998 [hereinafter ECOWAS Conflict
Management Framework], reprintedin AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 285.
99 Id., reprintedin AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 285.
'0o Id., 46(i), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 285, 298.
" Id., 46(ii), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 285, 298.
''2 Id., I 46(iii), reprintedin AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 285, 298 (emphasis
added).
103Unilateral military intervention means the willingness to, if necessary, employ enforcement
measures without authorization from the UN Security Council. It does appear that in 2001 the
OAS codified a right to democracy within its member states that is enforceable through PDI;
however, it is not clear whether prior authorization from the UN Security Council is required.
See Inter-American Democratic Charter, arts. 1, 17- 18, Sept. 11, 2001, 40 I.L.M. 1289;
Organization of American States [OAS], Table Comparing the Texts of the Inter-American
Democratic Charter-draft Resolution Rev. 7, The OAS Charter, and Resolution AG/RES. 1080
(XXI-O/91), on Representative Democracy, OAS Doc. GT/CDI-1/01 (July 16, 2001), available
at http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/tablesen.htm.
52(ii), reprinted in AFRICA:
'04 ECOWAS Conflict Management Framework, supra note 98,
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 285, 287.
'o0Id. T 52(iii), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 285, 287.
'o6Id. 52(iv), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 285, 287.
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1. Guinea-Bissau
On June 7, 1998, the democratically elected government of
President Bernardo Nino Vieira was threatened with a mutiny by highranking officers of the Armed Forces of Guinea-Bissau, led by Army
Chief of Staff Ansoumane Mane. °7 The mutiny was initiated after
President Vieira fired Mane for not investigating claims that his officers
were smuggling arms to the Casamance rebels in southern Senegal. 8
The mutineers also opposed government plans to reduce the military by
50 percent from its 1996 strength of twenty thousand."° By the end of
June, fighting between the mutineers and loyalist forces resulted in the
deaths of several hundred civilians and caused over two hundred and
Nevertheless, Vieira's
fifty thousand persons to be displaced."0
government always remained in effective control of the state."'
At the request of President Vieira and pursuant to bilateral
defense pacts, Senegal and Guinea intervened to quell the mutiny,
evacuate their nationals and those of other countries, and restore security
and constitutional legality to the country." 2 They did not intervene to
Vieira
enforce the peace but rather to safeguard Vieira's government.'
also requested that ECOWAS deploy ECOMOG in the country." 4
During the eighteenth Foreign Ministers' Conference on Security in
Abidjan, C6te d'Ivoire, from June 30 to July 3, ECOWAS foreign
ministers made tentative plans to intervene in Guinea-Bissau to restore
law and order to the country."'
However, after a series of peace talks sponsored by the
ECOWAS Committee on Guinea-Bissau and the Community of
Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) between August and December
1998, President Vieira and chief mutineer Mane agreed to the
deployment of ECOMOG to monitor the peace and the institution of a

107 Manes' Men: An Army Mutiny Has Quickly Become a Security Problemfor the Neighbouring

States, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, June 26, 1998, at 3.

108 id.

1o9 Id.
'1

Levitt, African InterventionistStates, supra note 8, at 27.
Id.

112

Senegal and Guinea immediately sent 1,300 and 400 troops, respectively, to the country. Id..

13 id.
"

ECOWAS Puts Out Plan to End Bissau Mutiny, PANAFRICAN NEWS AGENCY, July 5, 1998,

available at LEXIS (search "News, All (English, Full Text)" database for "ECOWAS puts out
plan").
115Levitt, African InterventionistStates, supra note 8, at 27.
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government of National Unity." 6 The ECOMOG force would provide
security along the Guinea-Bissau/Senegal border, keep the warring
parties apart, guarantee free access to humanitarian organizations
attempting to provide humanitarian relief to the domestic population, and
ensure that the conflict did not have any destabilizing effects on the
subregion." 7
The Abuja Accord specifically provided for the
deployment of ECOMOG to replace the Senegalese and Guinean
contingents. "8 On December 26, 1998, less than a week before
ECOMOG was to be deployed in Guinea-Bissau, the UN Security
Council adopted Resolution 1216, which "welcomes" the role of
ECOMOG in the implementation of the accord; "approves" the
ECOMOG mandate; "commends" ECOWAS efforts to restore peace and
security; and "affirms" that "the ECOMOG interposition force may be
required to take action [i.e., use force] ... in the discharge of its
mandate.""' 9 Between December 1998 and March 1999, Benin, the
Gambia, Niger, and Togo deployed approximately six hundred
ECOMOG troops in Guinea-Bissau"0 to "guarantee security along the
Senegalese/Guinea-Bissau border, keep the warring parties apart and
guarantee free access to humanitarian organizations."''
It is important to note that, like the interventions in Sierra Leone,
there were two separate interventions in Guinea-Bissau: the first was by
Senegal and Guinea; the second, by ECOWAS. While each intervention
had multiple legal bases, 2' the primary rationale for each was to protect
Vieira's controversial yet democratically elected government from being
overthrown by the military.'23
The central aim of the Senegalese and Guinean intervention was
quashing the mutiny, and the intervention was generally applauded by
political elites inside and outside of Africa.
The consent-based
intervention served as yet another example of the willingness of African
states to challenge unconstitutional regime changes. The swiftness and

116

Id. at 28-29.

117 The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution
18

1216 Relative to the Situation in Guinea-Bissau, 3(c), U.N. Doc. S/1999/294 (Mar. 17, 1999).
Id. 3(b), 11-12. The second round of peace talks which produced the Abuja Accord were held
in Abuja, Nigeria, on November 1, 1998. Id. 3.

"9 S.C. Res. 1216, IN 3,4,6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1216 (Dec. 21, 1998).

122

The Secretary-General, supranote 117, 11 (Mali had promised an additional 125 troops).
3(c), 4, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1216 (Dec. 21, 1998).
For an in-depth analysis of the legal bases for the Senegalese, Guinean and ECOWAS

123

intervention in Guinea-Bissau, see Levitt, African InterventionistStates, supra note 8, at 28-38.
Levitt, African Interventionist States, supranote 8, at 26-31.
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robust nature of the intervention by Senegal and Guinea was an early
sign of a trend toward PDI in Africa.
The situation in Guinea-Bissau threatened Vieira's government
and posed a genuine threat of death and grand suffering to the civilian
population; hence, the ECOWAS operation safeguarded Vieira's regime
and Bissauns and likely prevented civil war. ECOWAS leaders clearly
realized that the preservation of weak and arguably authoritarian but
democratically constituted governments was fundamental to long-term
peace and security in the subregion.124 Like the cases of Sierra Leone
and Haiti,'25 the Bissaun case also confirmed that an intervention taken to
preserve democracy could be lawful and legitimate. This assertion is
further supported by the UN's formal sanction of the operation as well as
the lack of any formal protest as to its lawfulness.
In the wake of its peace operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
Guinea-Bissau, ECOWAS established a new conflict mechanism to
prevent, manage, and resolve future conflicts.

D. THE ECOWAS CONFLICT PROTOCOL
In December 1999, approximately one year after the introduction
of the Framework and the launch of the Guinea-Bissau operation,
ECOWAS adopted the Protocol Establishing the Mechanism for Conflict
Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security
("Conflict Protocol"), which aims to implement further Article 58 of the
Revised Treaty.' 6 The Conflict Protocol recognizes that peace, security,
stability, democracy, and good governance are central to the development
of the West African region;2 7 one of its key objectives is to protect
member states from being "affected by the overthrow or attempted
overthrow of a democratically elected government."' 28 It also affirms its
commitment to promoting and consolidating democratic government and
institutions in each member state, supporting processes for the political
124

See generally Fielding, supra note 97, at 329.

125See generally Acevedo, supra note 14, at 119 (providing an authoritative analysis of the legality
126

of the OAS response to the 1993 Haitian crisis).
Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peace-

Keeping and Security, pmbl., ECOWAS Doc. A/PI0/12/99 (Dec. 10, 1999), available at
[hereinafter ECOWAS Conflict
http://www.sec.ecowas.intlsitecedeao/english/aplO1299.htm
Protocol], reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 259, 261.-264.
127 Id., reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 259, 261-64.
128Id., reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 259, 261-64.
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restoration of collapsed governments or those that have been seriously
eroded, and protecting fundamental human rights and freedoms.' 29
The ECOWAS Conflict Protocol also aims to prevent, manage,
and resolve internal and interstate conflict-and here it states that
Paragraph 46 of the Framework governs these matters. 3 ° Like the
Framework, Article 22 of the Conflict Protocol states that
peacekeeping and the restoration of peace, humanitarian intervention
during humanitarian disasters, and the enforcement of sanctions,
including embargoes, are key responsibilities of ECOMOG. 3 '
Article 25 of the Conflict Protocol complements Paragraph 46 of
the Framework, stating that ECOWAS may take enforcement action in
internal conflicts: (1) that "threaten to trigger a humanitarian disaster or
that pose a serious threat to peace and security in the sub-region;" (2)
where there has been a "serious and massive violation of human rights
and the rule of law;" and (3) when there has been an "overthrow or
attempted overthrow of a democratically elected government."'32
Invoking these considerations, ECOWAS sought to establish an
ECOMOG force along the border areas of Guinea and Liberia in
December 2000 to prevent skirmishes between the two countries from
escalating into full-blown conflict.'33 The ECOWAS conflict mechanism
also served as first responder to the crisis in C6te d'Ivoire in October
2000.
1. Cbte d'Ivoire
In October 2000 C6te d' Ivoire's current president, Laurent
Gbagbo, was declared the winner of a bitterly contested national election
that was decided in his favor by the country's Supreme Court.'34 Since
then he has not been able to bring sustainable peace to the embattled
nation.'35
29 Id. arts. 2, 45, reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 259, 264, 281.
"o Id. art. 3, reprintedin AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 259, 265.
""

Id. art. 22, reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 259, 272 (emphasis

added).
'3 Id. art. 25, reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 259, 274 (emphasis
added).

113
Decision Dec. 4/12/00 Establishing a Force of ECOMOG Armed Monitors along the Border
Areas of Guinea and Liberia (Dec. 16, 2000), http://www.sec.ecowas.int/sitecedeao/english/
adec04122000.htm.
'
Levitt, The Law on Intervention, supra note 1, at 54.
135id.
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The root of the current crisis in C6te d'Ivoire dates back to
September 2002 when approximately eight hundred discontented
soldiers calling themselves the Patriotic Movement of C6te d'Ivoire
overthrew Gbagbo's government and attacked military installations in
the commercial, administrative, and diplomatic center, Abidjan, and in
the second largest city, Bouake.' 36 The rebels feared being dismissed
from the army for disloyalty,'37 and they wanted to challenge the
government's so-called prejudicial "Ivoirit6" policy, which required all
inhabitants of the country to carry identification cards prior to the
issuance of a ballot in all national and regional elections.'38 The revolt
ultimately divided the country between the rebel-controlled north and
the loyalist south.'39 As a result, Gbagbo's government lost de facto
control of the country.
France, which had twenty thousand nationals in the country,
dispatched paratroopers to C6te d'Ivoire to protect its citizens after
initial hostilities broke out in 2000. 40 It provided transportation and
security to an ECOWAS mediation team that met with the junta. 4 ' The
mediation team communicated the organization's position of not
supporting the overthrow of DCGs and threatened to deploy ECOMOG
in the country if the warring parties could not resolve the situation,
including a return to constitutional order.'42
In October 2002, at the request of President Gbagbo, ECOWAS,
acting under the authority of its Conflict Protocol, instituted a peacekeeping force to monitor the cease-fire agreement in C6te d'Ivoire' 43
Efforts by ECOWAS, the United Nations, France, and the African Union
136 The Nightmare Scenario: An Army Rebellion May Send the Once-Prosperous Country Down the

137

138
139
140

Same Road As Its Unstable Neighbors, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, Sept. 27, 2002, at I [hereinafter The
Nightmare Scenario].
Id. But see Ivory Coast Troops Prepare to Attack Rebels Holding Major City, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
22, 2002, at 13 (showing that there is a discrepancy in the number of rebels in the group--the
N.Y. TIMES cites 750 men compared to AFRICA CONFIDENTIAL'S 789 men).
The Melting Pot Cracks, ECONOMIST, Oct. 5, 2002, at 64.
The Nightmare Scenario, supra note 136, at 2.
Alistair Thomson, West African Ministers Set to Talk to Ivorian Rebels, REUTERS NEwS, Oct. 3,

2002, available at LEXIS (search the "Reuters News" database for "'West African Ministers'
and Thomson"). See also The Nightmare Scenario, supra note 136, at 1.
4' Cote d'Ivoire; With No Ceasefire in Ivory Coast, War Threat Looms, AFRICA NEwS, Oct. 6,
2002, available at LEXIS (search "News, All (English, Full Text)" database for "No Ceasefire in
Ivory Coast").
142 Cote d'Ivoire Fighting Continues to Pose Significant Threat to Government, W. AFR. DEFENSE
& FOREIGN AFFAIRS DAILY, Oct. 8, 2002, available at LEXIS (search "News, All (English, Full
Text)" database for "Cote d'Ivoire Fighting Continues").
14 Levitt, The Law on Intervention, supra note 1, at 54-55.
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culminated in the Linas-Marcoussis Agreement of January 2003.14"
In early February 2004 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution
1527, which fully supported efforts by ECOWAS and France to
"promote a peaceful settlement of the conflict" and empowered the
ECOWAS mission in C6te d'Ivoire to stabilize the nation.'4 5 The
resolution authorized

1
France to support ECOWAS. 46

In late

February the Security Council adopted Resolution 1528 establishing the
UN Operation in CMte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) to guarantee the terms of the
peace agreement. 7 ECOWAS forces were integrated into UNOCI, and
French peacekeeping forces were authorized to "use all necessary
means" to support the UNOCI mission.' 48

After the ECOWAS action in Liberia, Sierra Leone, GuineaBissau and CMte d'Ivoire, the organization sought to develop a systematic
approach to promoting and protecting democracy in its member states and
adapted a bold protocol in this regard.

E. THE ECOWAS DEMOCRACY PROTOCOL

The ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance
("Democracy Protocol") is the most recent articulation of West Africa's
approach to the creation, preservation, and protection of democracy."' It
recognizes that in order for ECOWAS to be an effective peace broker, it
must pay special attention to the inherent linkages among "internal
crises, democracy and good governance, the rule of law, and human
rights."'5 ° In this context, the ECOWAS Democracy Protocol requires
ECOWAS member states to establish mechanisms that promote, protect,
and enforce democracy and human rights as a matter of law and policy
and obligates them to enshrine democracy as, in Samuel Barnes's phrase,
"an institutionalized process of decision making and societal learning,

144id.
145

S.C. Res. 1527, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1527 (Feb. 4, 2004).

146id.

S.C. Res. 1528, 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1528 (Feb. 27, 2004).
8.
149 ECOWAS, Protocol A/SPI/12/O1 on Democracy and Good Governance, Supplementary to the
Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution,
Peacekeeping and Security (Dec. 21, 2001), available at http://www.sec.ecowas.int/sitecedeao/
english/protocoles/Protocol%20on%20good-govemance-and-democracy-rev-5EN.pdf
[hereinafter ECOWAS Protocolon Democracy and Good Governance].
ld. at pmbl.
Is
147

148 Id. s
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not a substantive formula for a regime." '51 The Democracy Protocol also
forbids all cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment of civilians and
combatants during times of war and peace. 5 2 It specifically endorses the
notion of empowering the ECOWAS Court of Justice to adjudicate cases
"relating to violations of human rights" after domestic remedies have
been exhausted'53 and deems as essential the elimination of "all forms of
discrimination and harmful and degrading practices against women.""'
Last, it confirms that in West Africa, democracy is an entitlement to be
respected, promoted, and preserved by PDI, if necessary.
One month before it received its eighth ratification (Niger in
March 2005-nine are needed for it to enter into force), ECOWAS's
commitment to peace, security and democracy was tested in Togo.
1. Togo
On February 5, 2005, after thirty-eight years of authoritarian
"' President Gnassingbe Eyadema of Togo died of a heart attack,
rule, 55
leaving a power vacuum that led to a legislature-backed unconstitutional
transition of power to his son, Faure Gnassingbe Eyadema.'56 The
succession was backed by the army, which sealed the country's borders
shortly after Eyadema's death.5 7 The Togo Constitution provides that
the president of the National Assembly is to succeed the president in the
event of death or incapacity until special elections are held.'58 However,
the army redirected National Assembly Speaker Fanbore Natchaba's
plane to Benin in a bid to keep him from claiming the presidency.' 59 On
February 6, 2005, Togo's Assembly elected Faure president of the
National Assembly, which under Togolese law meant that he was to
succeed to the presidency."6 The assembly also passed a constitutional
amendment allowing him to fulfill his father's term, which was to last
151Samuel H. Barnes, The Contributionof Democracy to Rebuilding Post Conflict Societies, 95 AM

J. INT'L L. 86, 89 (2001).
152ECOWAS Protocolon Democracy and Good Governance, supra note 149, art. 22(2).
' Id. art. 39.
'54Id. art. 40.
'1"Jonathan Clayton, Togo "Military Coup" Hands Leadership to President'sSon, TIMES (UK),

February 7, 2005, at 3 1.
156Gnassingbe Eyadema Dies, 42 AFR. REs. BULL. 16,096 (2005).
157 id.

158id.
159Id.
'60

Id. See also The Struggle Continues in Togo, AFR. ANALYSIS, Feb. 11,2005, 1,available at
ProQuest (search the Ethnic Newswatch database for "Struggle Continues Togo").
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until 2008.61 This unconstitutional maneuver was directed by General
Zakary Nandja, Chief of Staff of the Forces Armres Togolaises. Nandja
had been a close advisor to President Eyadema and shared his Kaby6
ethnic background. 6 2 The strategy was also allegedly engineered by
Esso Solitoki, the Law Commission president.'63
Ethnic tensions were the root cause of the "coup."'"6 Simply
stated, the army leadership wanted to maintain power in the hands of the
Kaby6 ethnic group.'65 The military is reportedly 80 percent Kaby6.'66
Given the demographics of Togo, the military feared that free and fair
elections would lead to an increase in power by the Ewe ethnic group.'67
The Kaby6 ethnic group comprises 12 percent of the population, while
the Ewe ethnic group in the south comprises about 21 percent. 66
Natachaba is a member of the Chokossi ethnic group.'69
The unconstitutional seizure of power was swiftly condemned as
a military coup d'6tat by the UN, AU, and ECOWAS 7 ° For example,
Secretary-General Annan publicly expressed concern over the
extraconstitutional transfer of power in Togo in 2005, commenting that it
had "not been done in full respect of the provisions of [Togo's]
Constitution."''
Mamadou Tandja, president of Niger and ECOWAS
chairman, commented that the seizure of power was unjustifiable.'72
Alpha Oumar Konare, the Africa Union's West African commissioner,
referred to it as a military coup d'dtat 73 The African Union threatened
sanctions against Togo unless there was a restoration of "constitutional

161Ebow Godwin, President'sSon Takes Power in West African Coup: New Leader of Togo Named

Without Required Elections, CHI. SUN-TtMES, Feb. 7, 2005, at 35.
Continues in Togo, supra note 160.
162 The Struggle Continues in Togo, supra note 160.
163 id.
' Dynastic Dictatorship,AFR. CONFIDENTIAL,
165id.

See also The Struggle

Feb. 2005, at 5.

166id.
167id.

168PresidentialCandidates,42 AFR. RES. BULL. 16,141, 16,142 (Mar. 2005).
169Dynastic Dictatorship,supra note 164, at 6.
170

Clayton, supra note 155. See also Pressure Mounts on Gnassingbe, AFR.

ANALYSIS,

Feb. 25,

2005, at 1, available at ProQuest (search the Ethnic Newswatch database for "Pressure Mounts
Gnassingbe") (showing that ECOWAS and AU called for Faure's resignation and the return of
constitutional order).
171 Annan Calls on Togolese to Respect own Constitution in Appointing PresidentialSuccessor, UN
NEWS
SERVICE,
Feb. 7, 2005, at 1, available at http://www.un.org/apps/news/
printnewsAr.asp?nid= 13261.
172 Clayton, supra note 155.
173Id.
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legality."' 74 Tensions in Togo escalated as protestors took to the streets
in opposition to Faure.'
ECOWAS placed sanctions on Togo,
suspending it from participating in the organization, placed a travel ban
on its leaders, and imposed an arms embargo against the country.'76
After on-and-off negotiations and hard diplomacy by ECOWAS, and
massive street protests by thousands of Togolese resulting in violent
clashes with police and numerous deaths,' the situation in the country
became increasingly tense. A week after the protest-related killings, over
one hundred thousand
citizens flooded the streets of Lome to challenge
17
Faure' succession. 8
Simultaneously, the African Union Peace and Security Council
(AUPSC) demanded a return to constitutional rule, authorized sanctions
against Togo, 1 79 and openly supported those sanctions imposed by
ECOWAS.'5 0 A few days after ECOWAS imposed sanctions, Faure
Gnassingbe resigned as interim president of Togo,' causing some
discord among the various stakeholders as to whom should succeed
Eyadema.5 2 However, political muscle by ECOWAS managed to forge
a solution that eventually led to presidential elections. To the dismay of
the AU and ECOWAS leadership, Faure Gnassingbe was elected
president with approximately 60 percent of the vote. 3
Actions taken by ECOWAS and the AU to ensure a lawful and
constitutional transition of power in Togo succeeded. This was the
second time that an acting African president resigned due to internal and
external pressure, the resignation of Charles Taylor in Liberia in August
2003 being the first. What makes the case of Togo unique is that a state174 Nico

Colombant, ProtestMount Against Togo's New Leader, VOICE OF AMERICA, Feb. 8, 2005,

availableat 2005 WLNR 1830699.
175Brian Mealer, Three Killed in Togo Coup against Military President,SUNDAY INDEP. (Dublin),
Feb. 13, 2005. See also Pressure Mounts on Gnassingbe,supra note 170.
176World in Brief, Sanctions Placed on Togo, After 'Coup,' THE OBSERVER (London), Feb. 20,
2005, at News 26.
177Pressure Mounts on Gnassingbe,supra note 170.
17 Id.

William Eagle, AU Reiterates Support for West African Efforts to End Togo Crisis, VOICE OF
AMERICA, Feb. 25, 2005, available at 2005 WLNR 2993380. See also Press Release, AU
Condemns 'Military Coup,' Suspends Togo, AU Peace and Security Council (Feb. 25, 2005),
available at www.africafocus.org/docs05/togoO5O2.php.
180AU Condemns 'Military Coup,' Suspends Togo, supra note 179.
I8 Lydia Polgreen, West Africa Wins Again, with a Twist, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2005, at 18.
112FaureFalters, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, Mar. 4, 2005, at 5.
183Fears of Armed Insurrection, AFR. ANALYSIS, May 6, 2005, at 1, available at ProQuest (search
the Ethnic Newswatch database for "Fears Armed Insurrection" and select May 6, 2005 article
from the results).
"7
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sanctioned and unconstitutional transition of power by a duly elected
legislature was peacefully and successfully reversed by a regional
organization-albeit domestic protests were critical. Moreover, African
leaders themselves levied the central political pressure on Faure
Gnassingbe to resign, not Westerners, as was the case in Liberia. This
also was the second time that there was clear and unambiguous
condemnation of an unconstitutional change in power by the AU,
ECOWAS, UN, and wider international community; Sierra Leone was
the first. The actions of ECOWAS and the AU in Togo serve as yet
another example of their willingness to employ force to protect
democracy and the rule of law.
This is the background to the development of ECOWAS law,
which has evolved over the past thirteen years to meet the growing
security challenges in West Africa. ECOWAS has developed from an
organization created to spur regional economic integration and
development into a viable regional collective security arrangement. The
harsh consequences of warfare on peace, security, democratization, and
development in West Africa have forced the organization to establish an
innovative collective security system. ECOWAS law not only lays down
an unambiguous framework for the protection of democracy, human
rights, and the rule of law, it also codifies rights to PDI and
humanitarian intervention. The revolutionary evolution of ECOWAS
law comes at the behest of West African nations, which have
consistently demonstrated their willingness to forfeit sovereignty for
peace, security, and democracy. These developments have no doubt
influenced the wider corpus of international law, particularly the jus ad
bellum, and similarly have been influenced by it.
In the West Africa region, the development of PDI has occurred,
not only within the context of regional organizations such as ECOWAS,
but also by ad hoc coalitions composed of states from West and Central
Africa.
The most vivid example is the 1997 Mission for the
Implementation of the Bangui Agreement operation in the Central
African Republic, which was primarily composed of ECOWAS member
states, including Burkina Faso, C6te d'Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Senegal, and
Togo.
2. The CentralAfrican Republic
On April 18, 1996, the government of President Angel-Felix
Patasse (of the Sara group) was destabilized by the first of a series of
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mutinies by segments of the Armed Forces of the Central African
Republic (CAR) due namely to "widespread public discontent over
social and economic problems exacerbated by prolonged non-payment of
salary arrears."'"
Many public servants, including members of the
armed forces, had been demanding payment of salary arrears from
1992.85 According to Premier Jean-Paul Ngoupande, the mutineers
sought to overthrow Patasse's government.'86 However, the crisis was
temporarily halted when Paris unblocked seven hundred million CFA
francs, "alongside CFA three hundred million from the CAR Treasury, to
187

meet the arrears."'
Thereafter, conditions in the country worsened due to severe
economic problems precipitated by the 1996 mutinies and acute poverty,
which affected 35.5 percent of the population.'88 As a result, the country
underwent successive army mutinies throughout 1996, the last of which
was thwarted by robust military intervention by French Legionnaires
(primarily of African origin).'89 The intervention resulted in the deaths of
two French soldiers and eventually led to France's withdrawal. 9 ° The
situation in the country, however, continued to deteriorate, leading to two
more military uprisings that further destabilized Patasse's government. 9 '
On May 18, 1996, Sergeant Major Isidore Mathurin Dokodo, one
of the leaders of the April mutiny, and Lieutenant Zao took over about
two-fifths of Bangui, the capital city, for four days.'92 Both men are of
Yakoma origin. 9 3 Along with three hundred men from the Regiment
Mixte d'Intervention, they took over part of the capital temporarily and
garnered a moderate amount of support for the coup from the civilian
The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Resolution 1136 (1997)
Concerning the Situation in the Central African Republic, 4, delivered to the Security Council,
U.N. Doc. S/1998/61 (Jan. 23, 1998) [hereinafter Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to
Resolution 1136]. See also Angel on a Pinhead, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, May 10, 1996, at 3;
Mutineers' Mistake, 37 AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, June 7, 1996, at 8. One interesting point here is
that the mutineers appeared to be more concerned with receiving salary arrears than toppling the
government. In fact, it may be argued that the May mutiny was apolitical and corporatist.
185Angel on a Pinhead,supra note 184, at 3.
'8

186Echoes of Zaire, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, Nov. 29, 1996, at 4.

187Angel on a Pinhead,supra note 184, at 3.
'88The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-Generalon the United Nations Mission in the
Central African Republic, 30, delivered to the Security Council, U.N. DOC. S/1998/540 (June
19, 1998).
189Echoes of Zaire, supranote 186, at 5; Mutineers' Mistake, supra note 184, at 8.
9() French Leave, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, Oct. 10, 1997, at 7.

19' Levitt, African InterventionistStates, supra note 8, at 32.
192Mutineers' Mistake, supra note 184, at 8. See also Echoes of Zaire,supra note 186, at 4.
'9' Levitt, African InterventionistStates, supra note 8, at 32.
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populace.'94 Nevertheless, Patasse's government remained in effective
control of the state. France, said to have twenty-five hundred
legionnaires in the country, took the lead role in countering the attack.'95
It decided to launch a retaliatory attack against the rebels for killing
several French Legionnaires, not to preserve Patasse's government.'96
Although no official death toll was released, some in the CAR believed
that several hundred civilians died along with thirteen French
Legionnaires.'97 As a result, French action was severely scrutinized in
Paris, and amid growing pressure from the French parliament and
President Patasse, who held the country's former colonial patron in
disdain, France began to withdraw troops from the CAR in late
September 1997.198
Pursuant to requests by Patasse during the Nineteenth Summit
Meeting of Heads of State and Government of France and Africa held in
Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, in December 1996, the presidents of
Gabon, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali formed an International Mediation
Committee (IMC) to help resolve the conflict. 99 In accordance with the
Conference on Consensus-Building and Dialogue, held in Bangui in late
January 1997, and in response to requests by Patasse, the member states
of the IMC, chaired by President Omar Bongo of Gabon, established an
Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui
Agreements (MISAB) on January 31, 1997.2"
The MISAB was
Echoes of Zaire, supra note 186, at 4. The mutiny was in part a manifestation of deep-seated
ethno-political tensions between followers of ex-President Andre Kolingba, who was from the
Yakoma group, and his successor Patasse, who was from the Sourmah-Kaba clan of the Sara (15
percent of the population). The mutiny was triggered when the Presidential Guard (hereinafter
Guard) attempted to arrest Captain Anicet Saulet Yavro for financial irregularities. Yavro was a
senior representative of the Yakoma group and former head of the Socidt6 Centrafricaine de
Telecommunications under the Kolingba regime. Yavro attempted to evade arrest and shot and
killed a member of the Guard. Thereafter, the same Yakoma troops who orchestrated mutinies
earlier that year came to his aid and attacked the Guard and other loyalist forces. To make
matters worse, the military did not trust that Patasse would honor or implement a general
amnesty to which they were entitled under an earlier peace agreement between the government
and military stemming from mutinies in April 1996. They believed that he would arrest their
leaders and disband their regiment. Mutineers' Mistake, supra note 184, at 8. The participants
of the May mutiny, led by Sergeant Major Isidore Mathurin Dokodo, were the same group that
mutinied earlier that year.
195 Mutineers' Mistake, supra note 184, at 8. This represented the fourth time that French troops
have intervened to save Patasse's regime. French Leave, supra note 190, at 7.
196Mutineers' Mistake, supra note 184, at 8.
197Echoes of Zaire, supra note 186, at 4.
198 Levitt, African Interventionist States, supra note 8, at 32.
'99 Id. at 33.
200 Letter dated 4 July 1997 from Mr. Ange-Fdlix Patasse, President of the Central African
Republic, addressed to the Secretary-General, reprinted in Security Council, Identical Letters
194
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mandated to restore peace and security to the country and monitor the
implementation of the Bangui peace agreements.2"' In this regard, it was
sanctioned to conduct operations to disarm the former rebels, the militia,
and all other unlawfully armed persons, and maintain peace and
security. °2
To support MISAB's efforts, on August 6, 1997, the UN
Security Council adopted Resolution 1125, which deemed the situation
in the CAR a threat to international peace and security and authorized the
MISAB to take enforcement action to ensure the security and freedom of
The UN Security Council adopted
movement of its personnel.0
additional resolutions in this connection. For example, on March 27,
1998, it adopted Resolution 1159 creating the UN Mission in the CAR
(MINURCA) to assist in the maintenance of peace, security, law, and
order; ensure security and freedom of movement of UN personnel and
the safety and security of UN property; and provide police training for
the national police and technical support to national electoral bodies."°
The UNSC mandated Secretary-General Annan to "secure a smooth
transition between MISAB and MINURCA by 15 April 1998. "205
While there were several legal bases for the intervention,2° what
is unique about the MISAB operation is that it marked the first time that
an ad hoc group of states in Africa collectively deployed forces in a state
outside of their region to prevent civil war by safeguarding a fledging
DCG. °7
The interventions by ECOWAS in Liberia, Sierra Leone, GuineaBissau, C6te d'Ivoire, and Togo, the institution of new conflict
mechanisms, and the MISAB operation in the CAR were all premised in
part on the notion that the threat or overthrow of a DCG was a root cause
of underdevelopment and insecurity in West Africa and Africa generally.
Dated 18 July 1997 From the Charg6 D'Affaires A.I. of the Permanent Mission of the Central
African Republic to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and to the President
of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/1997/561 (July 22, 1997).
20'Mandate of the Inter-African Force to Monitor the Implementation of the Bangui Agreements,
art. 2, reprintedin Security Council, supra note 200.
202 Id.
203 ld. 19.

204S.C. Res. 1159, TT 9-10, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1159 (Mar. 27, 1998).

Approximately 1,350

personnel partook in the mission.
Id. I[I I.
206 For an analysis of the legal bases for the MISAB intervention in the CAR, see Levitt, African
20

InterventionistStates, supra note 8, at 31-35.
207It is important to note that the MISAB mission in the CAR was, with the exception of Chad,
composed entirely of West African states. Id. at 35.
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These threats or coups therefore were prohibited in law and protected
against in practice.
As the next section will illustrate, like ECOWAS and certain
states in Central Africa, the South African region has also taken assertive
action to fashion new security structures and employ force to safeguard
democracy.

V. THE SOUTHERN AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY

ECOWAS has fashioned the most radical law and collective
security framework on intervention, but it is not alone in its efforts. The
Southern African Development Community (SADC) has also
established a new regime and dynamic framework to ensure peace,
security, and democracy in southern Africa.

A. THE SADC TREATY AND ORGAN

The SADC emerged in January 1992 as the successor
organization to the Southern African Development Co-ordination
Conference, which had been founded by the then front-line states in
order to reduce regional dependence on apartheid South Africa.2 8 The
succession appears to have been partly inspired by the changing
political environment in South Africa following Nelson Mandela's
release from prison in 1990 and the ongoing efforts to fully
dismantle the country's apartheid system.2° In October 1993 the new
SADC Treaty entered into force.210 It is concerned with involving the
people in the southern Africa region in the process of development,
particularly through the "guarantee of democratic rights, observance of
human rights and the rule of law."'1' In fact, one of its core principles
is that SADC and its member states respect and protect "human rights,
democracy, and the rule of law.2 1 In this context, two of the SADC's

208

209
210

211
212

Levitt, The Law on Intervention, supra note 1, at 55.

See also Angola-Botswana-Lesotho-

Malawi-Mozambique-Namibia-Swaziland-Tanzania-Zambia-Zimbabwe: Treaty of the Southern
African Development Community, August 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 116 [hereinafter SADC Treaty].
Levitt, The Law on Intervention, supra note 1, at 55.
SADC Treaty, supra note 208, at 116.

Id. at pmbl.
Id. art. 4(c).
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key objectives are to "evolve common political values" and "promote
and defend peace and security."2 3
In an effort to build capacity and systematize its approach to
conflict management and security, the SADC adopted an important
security instrument.
B. THE SADC ORGAN

In June 1996 SADC adopted the Organ on Politics, Defense
and Security (OPDS).2" 4 Like the SADC Treaty, one of its key
principles is the observance of "human rights, democracy and rule of
law." 5 While the OPDS has numerous objectives, protecting the
people and the development of the region from instability from the.
"breakdown of law and order," including all types of conflict, and the
promotion of democratic institutions and practices are central.2t 6
Objective (g) states that where diplomatic efforts fail, the OPDS is
responsible for recommending punitive measures to the summit of the
heads of state of SADC members." 7 It also states that measures to be
taken in this regard will be further elaborated in a protocol on peace,
security, and conflict resolution.218
The SADC system was tested in 1998 when the government of
the small landlocked nation of Lesotho was challenged from within.
1. Lesotho
The root causes of the Lesotho crisis in 1998 can be traced back
to events in 1993 when the Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD) was
elected into power." 9 Political party rivalry stemming from the adoption
of the Constitution of Lesotho, which entered into force on April 2 of
that year, was severe, and structural tensions between elements of the
213

Id. arts. 5 (b), (c).
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216
217
218
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http://www.sadc.int/news/news-details.php?newsid=215
[hereinafter
SADC
1996
Communiqu6]. See also AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 327; Willie
Breytenbach, Failure of Security Co-operation in SADC: The Suspension of the Organ for
Politics, Defence and Security, 7 S. AFR. J. OF INT'L AFF., 85, 86 (2000); Levitt, The Law on
Intervention, supra note 1, at 55.
SADC 1996 Communiqud, supra note 214.
Id.
Levitt, The Law on Intervention, supra note 1, at 55.
Id.
Levitt, African InterventionistStates, supra note 8, at 35.
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security forces and the executive in 1994 also combined to ignite the
1998 crisis.2"' From 1997 onward, political tensions escalated as political
rifts continued unabated between LCD on one hand and the Basotho
National Party (BNP), Basotholand Congress Party (BCP), and the
Maramatlou Freedom Party (MFP) on the other. 2 ' In early September
1998 such tensions found overt political expression when approximately
ten thousand opposition protestors camped outside the palace of King
Letsie II. 222 Their protests arose amid allegations from opposition party
leaders that the LCD rigged the May 1998 elections in which it won
seventy-nine of Lesotho's eighty voting districts.223 The situation was
further exacerbated by the delayed release of the findings of the Troika
Commission (consisting of Botswana, South Africa, and Zimbabwe) with
regard to the elections224 and by Prime Minister Phakalitha Mosisili's
dismissal of a well-respected military officer for sympathizing with
election demonstrators. 2 5 Taken together, these factors exacerbated
political discontent among segments of the civilian populace and
numerous junior military officers, creating an extremely volatile
environment. 2 6
On September 11, 1998, these officers began a mutiny, arguably
orchestrated by Finance Minister Retselisistoe Sekonyana's BNP, against
the government.2 7 They arrested twenty senior military officials and
forced their commander, Lieutenant General Makhula Mosakeng, to
broadcast his resignation over Radio Lesotho.2 Consequently, several
violent clashes broke out between loyalist and opposition forces.229
When Mosisili returned from a SADC meeting in Mauritius on
September 15, he found the country in turmoil. Mutinous soldiers and
other protesters stole and impounded eighty government vehicles from
civil servants and stoned vehicles belonging to ministers, looted local
homes and businesses, burned down government buildings, prevented

21,

Id.
Id. at 36.
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Id.
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Id.
The Troika Commission (or Langa Commission) was established by the parties at conflict to
investigate allegations of foul play by Lesotho's Independent Electoral Commission and was
presided over by Pius Langa, the deputy president of South Africa's Constitutional Court.
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Militantsand Monarchs, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, Sept. 25, 1998, at 6.
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Id. at 6 (text box titled "Military Mayhem").
Levitt, African InterventionistStates, supra note 8, at 36.

227 Id.

228Militantsand Monarchs, supra note 224, at 5.
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government employees from going to work, and made death threats
against Mosisili and other senior officials.23 ° In addition, on September
18, opposition parties demanded the "government's resignation, the
dissolution of parliament and the appointment by the King of an interim
government including equal numbers from all major parties."23' The
capital city, Maseru, was in chaos as elements in the Lesotho military
and police force, which appeared to sympathize with the protestors, took
no action to quell the mutiny.232
Fearing that a military coup d'6tat was imminent and uncertain
about how long loyalist forces could maintain law and order, Prime
Minister Mosisili requested that South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and
Mozambique militarily intervene to restore law and order to Lesotho in
"accordance with SADC agreements." '33 Nevertheless, his government
remained in effective control of the state.234 On September 22, after
Zimbabwean Robert Mugabe, president and former chairman of the
OPDS, 235 allegedly refused to receive communications from Buthelezi
about the Lesotho crisis, South Africa sent six hundred troops and
Botswana sent two hundred troops to Lesotho pursuant to Mosisili's
request.236 South African forces launched a robust intervention early that
morning, which resulted in the deaths of 49 soldiers on both sides and the

230SA Troop Alert as Meseru Mutinies, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE (Johannesburg), Sept. 24, 1998,
http://www.mg.co.za/articledirect.aspx?articleid= 181249&area=%2farchives print edition%2f;
Mayhem Spreads Throughout Lesotho, MAIL & GUARDIAN ONLINE (Johannesburg), Sept. 24,
1998,
http://www.mg.co.za/articledirect.aspx?articleid=214086&area=%2farchives__online_
edition%2f.
231Levitt, African InterventionistStates, supra note 8, at 36.
232 Id.

233 Id. It is doubtful that SADC could validly invoke a right of humanitarian intervention. At the

time of the intervention, there were no widespread violations of human rights that amounted to
grand human suffering: the government had not collapsed, nor was it descending into anarchy.
Although it is debatable whether the LCD government was in the process of being violently and
illegally dislodged, the people of Lesotho were arguably ambivalent about the mutiny or
attempted coup. Consequently, South Africa and Botswana were entitled to rely on SADC law
and Mosisili's request as bases for intervening.
234Levitt, African InterventionistStates, supra note 8, at 37.
235SADC 1996 Communiqu6, supra note 214. See generally SADC, Strategic Indicative Plan for
the Organ on Politics, Defense and Security Cooperation, Aug. 5, 2004 [hereinafter SADC Plan
for the Organ for Politics, Defense & Security], available at http://www.sadc.int/
english/documents/legal/protocols/politics.php#2; Breytenbach, supra note 214, at 85; Maxi van
Aardt, The SADC Organ for Politics,Defence and Security: Challengesfor Regional Community
Building, S. AFR. J. OF INT'L AFF., Winter 1997, at 144.
236 South Africa and Botswana later increased these numbers to 1000 and 460, respectively.

Little Kingdom, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, Oct. 9, 1998, at 6-7.
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capture of 170 mutinous Lesotho soldiers.237 Botswana contingents
arrived later in the day.238 Arrival of reinforcements from South African
and Botswana exacerbated the crisis; 239 nevertheless, by the end of
October 1998 Maseru began to return to normal, and the LCD and
opposition parties signed a tentative peace agreement.2'
2. South Africa and Botwana's SADC Intervention
The South African and Botswanan intervention in Lesotho can
legally be justified as a SADC operation because it took place under the
"authoritative veil" of SADC, among other reasons; 24' however, from an
operational standpoint, it clearly was not coordinated by the SADC
secretariat or other authority in the organization. It was, rather, an ad hoc
operation conducted by South Africa and Botswana in accordance with
or under SADC law.242 This point explains why some analysts have,
perhaps rightly, scrutinized the political and operational problems
associated with the status and function of the OPDS vis-A-vis the Lesotho
2 43
Hence, a distinction must be drawn between legal and
crisis.
operational concerns related to the mission, as the legal framework for
the OPDS had already been adopted at the time of the intervention, and
thus it forms an important part of the jus ad bellum in the southern
African region."
Like Doe, Kabbah, Vieira, and Patasse, Mosisili requested
outside assistance to restore law and order and preserve his government.
What makes the Lesotho intervention unique is that it was the first
237

Verbatim MAIL &
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(Johannesburg), Sept. 25, 1998, http://www.mg.co.za/

articledirect.aspx?articleid=208438&area=%2farchives-print-edition%2f
Mandela).
238 Levitt, African InterventionistStates, supranote 8, at 37.
2,9 id.

(quoting

Nelson

240 Id.

24' Id. at 35-40.
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Id. at 40.

South Africa and Botswana's intervention in Lesotho was similar to Nigeria's in

Liberia (1990) and Senegal and Guinea's into Guinea-Bissau (1998) except that the Lesotho
operation was not followed by a formal SADC or UN operation as was the case in the
aforementioned examples.
243 Id. One key reason why the OPDS was dysfunctional was because of geopolitical tensions
between Mandela and Mugabe. For example, Mandela wanted it to be under the political and
jurisdictional control of the Summit of the Heads of State and Government of SADC whereas
President Mugabe insisted that it be autonomous.
244 For purposes of this analysis, whether South Africa and Botswana followed internal SADC
procedures before deploying forces does not appear to affect the legality of the operation in the
broad sense or invalidate it from being a hard example of PDI.

Vol. 24, No. 3

Pro-DemocraticIntervention in Africa

intervention by a regional organization to safeguard a DCG in the
southern Africa region and serves as yet another example of the
readiness of African regional organizations to use force to protect
democracy or legitimate rule.
In the wake of the Lesotho operation, SADC made concerted
efforts to strengthen the legal and operational bases for future peace and
security operations and eventually adopted a protocol on politics,
defense, and security cooperation.
C. THE SADC CONFLICT PROTOCOL
The SADC Protocol on Politics, Defense and Security
Cooperation formally came into force on March 2, 2004. It aims to
strengthen the OPDS by supporting cooperation in regional security
through conflict management and coordination of member states in
international and regional peacekeeping, including enforcement
measures.2 45 Furthermore, as with Paragraph 46 of the ECOWAS
framework, Article 11 (2)(b) of the SADC Protocol sets out elaborate
criteria for when the OPDS may authorize regional intervention in
internal conflicts. These criteria include when there is (1) large-scale
conflict or violence between sections of the population of a state or
between the state and/or its armed or paramilitary forces and sections
of the population; (2) a threat to the legitimate authority of the government (such as a military coup); (3) a condition of civil war or insurgency;
and (4) any crisis that could threaten the peace and security of other
member states.246 Under the protocol, the OPDS may also decide to
intervene in a state when a conflict "threatens peace and security in the
region. '
Hence, the laws of SADC codify not only a right to PDI but also
the right of the community to quell nearly every conceivable type of
threat to legitimate authority and safeguard legitimate regimes
irrespective of their political character. The development of ECOWAS
and SADC rules on the preservation of DCGs coincided well with the
emergence of the African Union and its new framework for protecting
against unconstitutional changes of government.
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VI. THE AFRICAN UNION
The Constitutive Act of the African Union came into force in
March 2001.24
The Act lays out a completely new security and
governance framework for the African continent. The African Union's
new European Union-like structure varies considerably from that of its
predecessor, the Organization of African Unity.
Article 4, on the principles of the African Union, includes three
very important provisions on regional security, peacekeeping, and
democracy: One accords the union the "right" to intervene in a member
state in respect of "grave circumstances," namely, war crimes,
genocide, and crimes against humanity; 249 another accords member
states the "right" to request the AU to intervene in order to restore
peace and security; 2 0 and the third provision condemns and rejects
unconstitutional changes of government.25 '
These provisions
complement and "continentalize" those enumerated in ECOWAS and
in SADC law.
Nearly two years after the adoption of the Constitutive Act the
AU expanded its authority to employ force in AU member states with
the adoption of the Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of
the African Union.252 Specifically, the protocol expanded the scope of
Article 4(h) to not only empower the AU with the power to intervene in
member states to prevent war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity but also when there is a "serious threat to legitimate order",
which goes beyond the horatory and toothless "right" of condemnation
and rejection provided for in the Constitutive Act.253 It also modifies
and expands the powers enumerated in the AUPSC Protocol from
merely imposing sanctions in response to unconstitutional changes of
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4(h),
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11,

2000,

available at

http://www.africa-union.org/root/aulAboutAU/ConstitutiveAct-en.htm, reprinted in AFRICA:
SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 35, 41.
249Id., reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 35, 41.
250Id. at 4(g), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 35, 41.
251 Id. at 4(p), reprintedin AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 35, 41.

252African Union, Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2003),
available at http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/Documents/Treaties/treaties.htm
(follow
"Protocol on Amendments to the Constitutive Act of the African Union" hyperlink) [hereinafter
African Union, Amendments to the Constitutive Act Protocol] (adopted by the 1st Extraordinary
Session of the Assembly of the Union in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on Feb. 3, 2003 and by the 2d
Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the Union in Maputo, Mozambique, on July 11, 2003). The
Protocol came into force on July 25, 2006.
253 Id. at art. 4(p).
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government to the use of force to reverse them. The AU's expansion of
the right to use force to safeguard legitimate order essentially codifies a
right to PDI in AU law and serves as yet another example of the
crystallization of a norm of PDI in Africa.
A. THE NEW PARTNERSHIP FOR AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT
The AU's new approach to safeguarding democracy was further
elaborated in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD),
which is a framework of interaction and program of action established by
African leaders to renew the continent through a series of initiatives in
conflict mitigation, democracy and governance, human rights and the
rule of law and security, among others.254
The Peace and Security and Democracy and Political
Governance initiatives of NEPAD acknowledge that development is
impossible in the "absence of true democracy, respect for human rights,
peace and good governance."25 Under NEPAD, African states agreed to
"respect the global standards of democracy," allowing for fair democratic
elections to "enable people to choose their leaders freely" and achieve
256
"basic standards of good governance and democratic behavior.
The crises in S~o Tomd and Prfncipe would serve as the AU's
first real test of its commitment to democracy.
B. SA O TOMI AND PRiNCIPE

On July 15, 2003, while he was attending an African/AfricanAmerican summit in Nigeria,2 7 President Fradique de Menezes of Sao
Tom6 and Prfncipe was dislodged in a bloodless coup d'6tat by a small
group of junior military officials, led by Major Fernando Pereira.2 s The
coup leaders captured Prime Minister Maria das Neves, Natural
Resources Minister Rafael Branco, Defense Minister Fernando Danqua,
and Finance Minister Maria Tebds Torres.2 19 The government officials
254 New Partnership for African Development,

47-49, October 2001, http://www.nepad.org/
2005/files/documents/inbrief.pdf.
255 Id. [79.
256 Id. See also id. T 82.
257 Kudos for Obasanjo's Bullying Diplomacy, AFR. ANALYSIS, Aug. 8, 2003, at 3, available at
258

ProQuest (search the Ethnic Newswatch database for "Obasanjo Bullying Diplomacy").
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16, 2003, availableat 2003 WLNR 343477.
Desperados, AFR. CONFIDENTIAL, July 25, 2003, at 8.
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were released shortly after their capture after pressure from international
mediators coordinated by Congo-Brazzaville's foreign minister,
Rodolphe Adada. 2 °
The coup included elements that attempted to seize power in
1988 along with former soldiers from apartheid South Africa's infamous
32nd Buffalo Battalion.26 ' The coup seems to have been precipitated by
various internal and external actors vying for political power and
interests in the country's oil reserves.262 However, coup leaders stated
that they chose to take action in response to the country's poor standard
of living and chronic political instability. 263 There has been some
speculation that disgruntled members of the Christian Democratic Front
(FDC) helped organize the coup, given allegations of corruption in the
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id.
Troubled Waters Over Oil: Oil Curses Another African State,

THE ECONOMIST, July 19, 2003, at
37. See also Sao Tome and Principe: Mercenaries, Corruption and Poverty Complicate the
Road to an Oil Boom, U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORD. OF HUMANIT'N AFFAIRS, Sept. 9, 2006,
http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportlD=47129; Gerhard Seibert, Coup d'dtat in Sao Tomd e
Principe:Domestic Causes, the Role of Oil and Former "Buffalo " Battalion Soldiers 4, Inst. For
Security Stud., paper 81 (Nov. 2003), available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/papers/
81/paper8 I.pdf; Johann Smith, Inst. for Security Stud., Memorandum on S. Tomi e Principe 5,
n.1 (July 17, 2003), available at http://www.iss.co.za/AF/current/saotomejul03.pdf. The FDC
was founded in the late 1990s by former members of the National Resistance Front of So Tom6
and Principe (FRNSTP). The group was in opposition to the socialist policies of Sao Tomd
president Manuel Pinto da Costa and was exiled to Liberville, Gabon. President Omar Bongo of
Gabon supported the group because he wanted to prevent Sao Tom6 and Prfncipe from being
integrated into the alliance of Algiers, Conakry, Brazzaville, and Luanda. Once Sao Tom6 and
Principe began to liberalize, Bongo reconciled with the ruling party and expelled the FRNSTP.
The group sought refuge in Kribi, Cameroon, in 1986. After cleavages emerged in the group,
most members of the FRNSTP left Cameroon and sought asylum in the South African-controlled
area of Walvis Bay in Nambia. The majority of those relocated to Nambia were descendants of
Cape Verdian contract workers. They were detained as illegal immigrants by South Africa and
forced to either fight with the 32d Buffalo Battalion or remain in prison. Fifty-three members of
the FRNSTP fought for the apartheid regime of South Africa and gained South African
citizenship. The 32d Buffalo Battalion was based in northern Nambia and was used as special
forces for operations inside of Angola. After Nambia achieved independence in 1990, many of
the soldiers began to work for the South African security/mercenary company Executive
Outcomes. The remaining members of the FRNSTP who remained in Gabon led an invasion of
forty-four mostly unarmed men to overthrow Sao Tom6's president in 1988. Sao Tom6 security
forces quickly detained the group, which had traveled to the country by canoe. Most of the
conspirators were tried by a local court in 1989. However, President da Costa pardoned all of
them in April 1990. Later that year the FRNSTP members, including 2003 coup leader Sabino
dos Santos, formed the FDC. After Executive Outcomes was disbanded in 1998, former
FRNSTP members, including the co-leader of the 2003 coup, Al~rcio Costa, joined their old
comrades in the FDC.
262 Michael Peel, Middle East and Africa: Leader of Sao Tome Coup Callsfor Fresh Elections, FIN.
TIMES (London), July 18, 2003, at 6.
263 Gethin Chamberlain, Sao Tome Coup Linked to Oil Reserves, SCOTSMAN (Edinburgh),
July 17,
2003, at 12.
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way Menezes awarded oil contracts for reserves located in a zone that is
being jointly developed with Nigeria.2 " The waters separating Nigeria
and Sdo Tom6 and Prfncipe contain an estimated six billion barrels of
2 65
oil.
In particular, the International Monetary Fund determined that
deals with Exxon Mobil and Nigeria-based Chrome were unfair.266 The
president's attempts to renegotiate the contracts led to his public
admonishment by senior members of the political class. 267 In January
2003 the president dissolved parliament, partly because of disagreements
over the right of the executive to negotiate oil deals.26 Soon after, the
parliament was reinstated, but tensions remained over a payment the
president received from an oil firm and allegedly used for campaign
purposes. 69 In addition, in October 2002 Menezes dismissed Gabriel
Costa as prime minister and replaced him with Maria das Neves. 2" The
president made the change following complaints from the army that
Costa improperly promoted two high-ranking officers. 27 ' The new prime
minister appointed fourteen new government ministers.272
The coup was short-lived because of opposition to it by Nigeria,
the AU, and other stakeholders.273 On the day of the coup, Menezes
appealed to the international community and specifically to the
governments of Angola and Nigeria to restore him to power.274 The coup
met with a "storm of international protest ... as neighboring countries,
the Africa Union, as well as the United States and the United Nations
strongly condemned the one day-old coup. The common position has
264 Sao Tomg and Principe: Mercenaries, Corruptionand Poverty Complicate the Road to an Oil
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GLOBE, Nov. 30, 2003, at A8 (explaining that, in 1997, a small Houston-based oil company,
Environmental Remediation Holding Corp. (ERHC) guaranteed $5 million for drilling rights in
Sdo Tomd. When Menezes was elected in 2001, he renegotiated the unfair contract after Exxon
Mobil was brought in by ERHC. However, it was later revealed that Menezes received $100,000
from the chairman of ERHC. Menezes said the money was a campaign contribution.).
267 Troubled Waters Over Oil: Oil Curses Another African State, supra note 261.
268Chamberlain, supra note 263, at 2.
269 id.
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BULL. 15,036 (2002).
271 ld.
272 id.

273 Seven-day Junta: Announced as an "International SOS," Oil Interests and the Chances of
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274Smith, supra note 261, at 2-3. See also Seibert, supra note 261, at 5.

Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal

been that the events in STP [Sao Tom6 and Prfncipe] amount to an
unconstitutional change of government and that STP's constitutional
'
legality must be restored as soon as possible."275
The Nigerian
government condemned the coup as "a gross violation" of the African
Union Constitution.276 President Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique,
former chairman of the AU, likewise condemned the coup277 and stated
that the "sole purpose of any negotiation was to restore constitutional
order to Sdo Tom6."27 Secretary-General Annan also condemned the
coup and called for the "unconditional restoration of constitutional
'
order."279

International. pressure and -hard diplomacy by Angola, Nigeria,
the Economic Community of Central African States, the Community of
Portuguese-Speaking Countries, the United States, and Portugal provided
little wiggle room for the junta. 8 President Obasanjo's stern diplomacy
produced a peace accord and led to the restoration of Menezes to
power.-' The UN praised the restoration of constitutional order; Annan
stated that the "positive outcome of the crisis in Sao Tome and Principe
reflects not only the will of African States to work together towards the
settlement of crises affecting countries on the continent, but also their
'
determination to promote and safeguard democracy." 282
The coup in Sdo Tom6 and Prfncipe provided the first test for the
AU's new peace and security framework. While no intervention was
necessary, the AU's use of coercive diplomacy to enforce its rules on
unconstitutional changes of government amounted to PDI.
It
demonstrated that African states are no longer willing to accept as fait
accompli unconstitutional seizures of power and that, at the very least in

Smith, supra note 261, at 2.
Chamberlain, supra note 263.
277 Coup in Island State with Big Oil Reserves, supra note 258.
278 No Military Intervention Yet, AGENCIA DE INFORMACAO DE MOCABIQUE, July 21, 2003,
availableat 2003 WLNR 478118.
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Africa, there has been a normative legal shift in the jus ad bellum toward
the recognition of democracy as an enforceable right. 283
In 2003, building on its conflict mitigation experiences and in
the wake of its involvement in resolving the conflict in Sdo Tom6 and
Prfncipe, the African Union adopted a peace and security protocol to
evolve further its peacemaking and collective security capability.
C. THE AU PEACE AND SECURITY PROTOCOL

The protocol establishing the Peace and Security Council of the
African Union (AUPSC) came into force on December 26, 2003, and
284
serves as the first continent-wide regional collective security system.
The AUPSC is empowered to carry out several important functions
that complement and evolve Africa's collective security
mechanisms. 2 5 Its key function is to promote peace, security, and
stability in Africa through early warning, preventive diplomacy,
mediation, and, most importantly, peace support operations,
intervention, humanitarian action, disaster management, peace-building,
post-conflict reconstruction, and any other function as may be decided
on by the African Union.2" 6 The AUPSC may authorize the use of
force in multiple contexts, including to safeguard democracy, thwart
conflict or protect human rights, ensure access to humanitarian
agencies, and deliver humanitarian relief during natural disasters.2 7
The AUPSC protocol empowers the AU to engage in
numerous activities, from policy oversight to full-fledged military
intervention. 288 Furthermore, the AUPSC is charged with instituting
283
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"sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of Government takes
'
place,"289
employing force to protect against a serious threat to
legitimate order,29 ° implementing "common defense policy,"29' and
co-coordinating and cooperating with subregional and regional
mechanisms (and the United Nations), particularly on peace and security
issues."' AU member states are bound by AUPSC decisions and
actions and "shall extend full cooperation to, and facilitate action by, the
Peace and Security Council for the prevention, management and
resolution of crises and conflicts."293
The AUPSC protocol confers on the AU more explicit legal
authority to engage in peace enforcement than the UN Charter does the
Security Council. The AU Constitutive Act and AUPSC Protocol
clearly delineate the circumstances under which PDI may take place:
when regimes come to power extraconstitutionally, to protect against a
serious threat to legitimate order,294 and during any other breakdown
of law and order as determined by the organization. Against this
background, it is more than evident that the AUPSC framework was
a response to Africa's fragile security environment and reflects African
leaders' recognition that an apparatus was needed to deal with any and all
security issues, especially serious threats to legitimate order and illegal
seizures of power.295
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African Union, Amendments to the Constitutive Act Protocol, supra note 252, art. 4(h).
291African Union, Peace and Security Council Protocol, supra note 284, art. 7, 1(h), reprintedin
289
290

AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 163, 169.
11(i), reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supranote 60, at 163, 169.
293 Id. art 7, 4, reprinted in AFRICA: SELECTED DOCUMENTS, supra note 60, at 163, 170.
294 It appears that the expansion of Article 4(h) under the protocol amending the AU Constitutive
Act to protect against a serious threat to legitimate authority lowers the threshold for intervention
from instances where constitutionally valid regimes have been overthrown to cases where there
are grave threats against them. African Union, Amendments to the Constitutive Act Protocol,
supra note 252, art. 4(h).
295The AU's PDI regime has become even stronger with the emergence of the Draft African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, which not only confirms that democracy is a
basic and enforceable right, but also permits intervention when "illegal means of accessing
power constitute an unconstitutional change of government" such as a "military coup d'etat
against a democratically elected government"; "intervention by mercenaries to replace a
democratically elected government"; "replacement of democratically elected government by
armed dissidents and rebels"; "refusal of an incumbent government to relinquish power to the
winning party after free, fair and regular elections"; and/or "manipulation of constitutions and
legal instrument for prolongation of tenure of office by a incumbent regime". Draft African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance, Art. 27 (2006) (unpublished document, on
file with author).
292 Id. art 7,
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D. AFRICA'S DARING EXAMPLE
The willingness of African states and institutions to codify a right
to PDI and to openly condemn in the continent's foremost political body
undemocratic seizures of power is a remarkable achievement and
advancement in the jus ad bellum. Even more surprising is the
willingness of African nations to contract away sovereignty and
authority and to endow an organization with the political and legal
clout to intervene in their internal affairs to safeguard democracy and
human rights.

VII. FINAL WORDS

The birth of this seemingly new African liberalism on the
regional security and democracy fronts has resulted in a whittling
away of the absolutist/positivist mantle of state sovereignty and
nonintervention and an acceptance of the logic of sovereignty as
responsibility.296 Africa's new paradigm of interventionism is not
only taking seriously its responsibility to protect human rights and
democracy2 97 but also helping to destroy the "tragic myth that the
interests of the people are one with those of their national
governments" (e.g., AU and ECOWAS action in Togo).298 Here, the
nexus between democracy and responsible governance is
unmistakable. While it is true that political elites often have mixed
motives for supporting particular policy prescriptions, democrats and
autocrats alike recognize that peace, security, and stability are
precursors to accessing the foreign capital needed to create enabling
environments for authentic political and economic development.
Both reformers and thieves acknowledge that it is necessary to have
some measure of stability to effectuate positive change in, or pilfer,
the state; hence, there are incentives for both democrats and autocrats to
operate in stable, conflict-free environments. This fact may explain the

296

See FRANCIS M. DENG ET AL., SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY: CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN
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See generally Jeremy I. Levitt, The Responsibility to Protect: A Beaver without a Dam?, 25
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L. 153 (2003) (reviewing ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect, supra note 4;
ICISS, The Responsibility to Protect: Bibliography,supra note 4).
298 Ibrahim J. Gassama, Safeguarding the Democratic Entitlement: A Proposalfor United Nations
MICH. J. INT'L
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general consensus among political elites in Africa to bestow regional bodies
with the authority to employ force to safeguard DCGs.
African states and their organizations have created the world's
most advanced and legally coherent frameworks to combat conflict and
regional insecurity and protect democracy.299 No other nations or regions
have offered comparable structures nor demonstrated a similar willingness
to sacrifice human and tangible resources and sovereignty for peace and
democracy. While not every African intervention discussed above
qualifies as PDI, the continuity in state practice and treaty-law
developments confirms the existence of, and strengthens, the PDJ norm.
The PDI norm has been spurred not only by state practice and treatylaw developments in Africa but by universal international law and practice and
several interconnected occurrences, including the popular intervention by the
UN and OAS in Haiti in 1994, recent decisions of the UN Credentials
Committee not to accredit regimes that come to power by overthrowing
democratic governments, and stem UN statements and declarations on the
sanctity of democracy and the unlawfulness of unconstitutional seizures of
power. For example, Secretary-General Annan stated that the "success of
Africa's third wave depends equally on respect for fundamental human
rights" and democratic rule.3 "° As previously noted, he has made the case
that African states can no longer tolerate coups against elected
governments or illegal seizures of power by military cliques and that the
international community and African states must be dedicated to a new
doctrine of African politics: "Where democracy has been usurped, let us
do whatever is in our power to restore it to its rightful owners, the
people." '' Elsewhere I have argued that "Annan's comments arguably
marked the beginning of a pendulum shift away from the UN's practice
of silence and inaction on issues it traditionally considered internal or
within the exclusive jurisdiction of states-and to a new doctrine that
299 However, the Organization of African States' adoption of the Inter-American Democratic

Charter (2001) and Resolution 1080 (XXI-O/91) on representative democracy seem to indicate
the organization's willingness to eventually build a viable conflict maintenance system.
300 Press Release, The Secretary-General, Secretary-General Calls for Efforts to Unleash African
'Third Wave' Based on Democracy, Human Rights, and Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc.
SG/SM/6245/Rev.1 AFR/9/Rev.1 (June 2, 1997).
301 Id. Annan has also appealed to the international community to "ostracize and isolate putschists"
and avoid mere passive verbal condemnations of coups against DCGs. He has even encouraged
ECOWAS to "deal" with elected governments that "violate constitutional norms and flout basic
principles of good governance." Press Release, The Secretary-General, Good Governmance [sic]
Essential for Political Stability, Economic Growth Says Secretary-General in Message to West
African Summit, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/9090 AFR/799 (Dec. 19, 2003) (delivered by Mr. Ahmedou
Ould-Abdallah, Special Representative of the Sec'y-General and Chief of UN Office for West
Africa).
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overrides state sovereignty to protect human rights and democracy."302
Similarily, African states were the first to substantially force the
pendulum to swing and hence are largely responsible for any normative
shift.
Africa's new interventionism (backed by hard law), taken together
with the international community's new attitude against unconstitutional
seizures of power, has not only influenced state behavior inside and outside
Africa; it has also added significant weight and shape to the development of
the corpus of international law including the emerging norm of PDI and the
doctrine of humanitarian intervention. Although it may be too early to claim
that a right of PDI exists under customary international law, its recognition as
a treaty-based right and one firmly established in customary regional law in
Africa and arguably Latin America is both timely and futuristic.

302 Jeremy I. Levitt, Illegal Peace?: An Inquiry into the Legality of Power-Sharing with Warlords

and Rebels in Africa, 27 MICH. J. INT'L. L. 495, 568 (2006).

